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In response to international concern surrounding the effects of global climate 
change the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change was drafted in 1998 at the third meeting of the Conference of 
Parties (COP-3). The Kyoto Protocol is aimed at reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions which cause global warming.
Conflicts may arise between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), 
such as the Kyoto Protocol, and international trade agreements, such as the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)/World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Member trade 
obligations under GATT/WTO and NAFTA may restrict freedom to participate in 
the Kyoto Protocol. Concern arises about the ability of a country that is member 
both to the WTO or the NAFTA, as well as to the Kyoto Protocol, to place trade 
restrictions on ERUs created in countries that are member to the WTO or the 
NAFTA but not party to the Kyoto Protocol. This paper will focus on such 
situations, with emphasis on the case of Canada and the United States (U.S.).
The manner in which member obligations under the WTO and/or NAFTA will 
affect the success of the emissions trading system under the Kyoto Protocol will 
depend largely on how the emission reduction units created by the Kyoto Protocol 
are classified under the WTO and the NAFTA. The classification will dictate 
which rules apply to trade in emission reduction units, and more importantly, 
which exemptions to these rules will apply. This paper will briefly review the 
relevant treaties involved, discuss the relationship between MEAs and general 
principles of International Law. and then proceed to examine Canada's options 
under three possible classification scenarios (goods, services, and non-violation). 
This paper will then shift focus to discuss how the NAFTA Environmental Side 
Agreement may hold the potential to protect Canada’s environmental laws (i.e. 
the Kyoto Protocol) from a U.S. challenge under the NAFTA. Lastly, this paper 
will touch on some alternative potential trade conflicts which may arise under the 
Kyoto Protocol’s emissions trading system.
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I. Introduction
In response to international concern surrounding the effects of global climate 
change the Kyoto Protocol’ to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change^ was drafted in 1998 at the third meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP-3). 
Global warming is caused by the presence, and continued release of large quantities of 
greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere. The Kyoto Protocol is aimed at reducing 
emissions of these gasses.
The Kyoto Protocol requires nations that are party to the treaty to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions to approximately 5% below 1990 levels by the year 2012. The 
Kyoto Protocol is currently undergoing a continued drafting process with anticipation of 
ratification by 2007. The Protocol will take effect 90 days after at least 55 countries 
ratify, and 55% of 1990 CO2 (or CO2 equivalent) emissions are accounted for. In light of 
the negotiations surrounding the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, a number o f concerns 
are arising surrounding the associated emission reduction credit trading mechanism 
contained therein.
Conflicts may arise between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), such 
as the Kyoto Protocol, and international trade agreements, such as the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)AVorld Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Member trade obligations under GATT/WTO and
’ Conference o f  the P arties to the Fram ework Convention on Clim ate Change: K yoto  Protocol. December 
10, 1997, U.N, Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.l, 37 I.L.M. 32 [hereinafter AiVoro Proloco/].
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Developm ent: Fram ework Convention on Climate 
Change, M ay 9, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force March 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC\.
1
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NAFTA may restrict freedom to participate in the Kyoto Protocol. Members to 
GATT/WTO and NAFTA are restricted in their ability to place quantitative barriers to 
trade (i.e. quotas, sanctions, taxes, etc.) affecting products or services from other member 
nations. Additionally, under the Kyoto Protocol, member nations may only use emission 
reduction units (ERUs) created in other Kyoto Protocol member nations for the purposes 
of accounting under the Protocol. Concern arises about the ability of a country that is 
member both to the WTO or the NAFTA, as well as to the Kyoto Protocol, to place trade 
restrictions on ERUs created in countries that are member to the WTO or the NAFTA but 
not party to the Kyoto Protocol. This paper will focus on such situations, with emphasis 
on the case o f Canada and the United States (U.S.). Canada and the U.S. are both party 
to both GATT/WTO and NAFTA. However, because the current President of the United 
States, George W. Bush, has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,^ Canada may have 
reason to be concerned about the trade implications associated with their own anticipated 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
The NAFTA and/or the WTO may become a barrier to the best available 
multilateral solution to global warming. The fear is that because the economic risk 
associated with ratifying the Kyoto Protocol is so great,'* Canada may be forced to 
abandon the Kyoto Protocol entirely. If these questions are eventually decided by a 
NAFTA panel it will have serious implications and ramifications for the future of market
 ̂President Bush issued a letter to several senators voicing the rejection. See letter from George W. Bush to 
Senator Chuck Hagel, et. al.(March 13, 2001) available at 
http;//www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2 0 0 1 /0 3 /2 0 0 10314.html
■* Som e authors argue that “no [other] M EA has had the potential to impact so many sectors o f  the 
econom y, so many economic interests and such high volum es o f  trade in products ands services.’' See 
Jacob Werksman, Greenhouse Gas Em issionsTrading and the If'TO, 8  Review  o f  European Community & 
International Environmental Law 3:251 (1999)
2
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based incentives as solutions to global environmental problems, particularly through the 
use o f MEAs.
The manner in which member obligations under the WTO and/or NAFTA will 
affect the success o f the emissions trading system under the Kyoto Protocol will depend 
largely on how the emission reduction units created by the Kyoto Protocol are classified 
under the WTO and the NAFTA. The classification will dictate which rules apply to 
trade in emission reduction units, and more importantly, which exemptions to these rules 
will apply. This paper will briefly review the relevant treaties involved, discuss the 
relationship between MEAs and general principles o f International Law, and then 
proceed to examine Canada’s options under three possible classification scenarios. The 
first scenario will assume that emission reduction units are classified as “goods” under 
the WTO, and therefore subject to the requirements o f the GATT and NAFTA rules 
pertaining to trade in goods. This section will examine related past conflicts reviewed by 
WTO dispute resolution panels, and attempt to reconcile the potential conflict described 
above between the NAFTA and/or WTO, and the Kyoto Protocol by exploring the option 
of a Canadian unilateral sanction^ on U.S. created emission reduction units.^ The second 
scenario will assume that emission reduction units are classified as “services,” and are 
therefore subject to the requirements o f the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) under the WTO and the NAFTA equivalent rules. This section will discuss
 ̂Because the Kyoto Protocol does not recognize ERUs created in non-Party nations, i f  Canada were to 
incorporate the Kyoto Protocol into domestic legislation through a statute, it would effectively be placing a 
sanction on ERUs created in any non-Party nation. This w ill be discussed in more detail below.
* Note this paper will also discuss the relationship between Multilateral Environmental Agreements and 
their relationship to international trade laws particularly the case o f  inconsistencies between these two types 
o f  agreements.
3
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possible sectors o f classification and compare the GATS and GATT stipulations with 
respect to exemptions. The last scenario will present an argument for why emission 
reduction credits should not be classified as neither “goods,” nor “services,” therefore 
falling outside the jurisdiction of the WTO and the NAFTA. This paper will then shift 
focus to discuss how the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement may hold the potential 
to protect Canada’s environmental laws (i.e. the Kyoto Protocol) from a U.S. challenge 
under the NAFTA. Lastly, this paper will touch on some alternative potential trade 
conflicts which may arise under the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions trading system.
II. Summary of Relevant Treaties
A. The Kyoto Protocol
1. Overview
The objective o f the Kyoto Protocol is to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations^ in the Earth’s atmosphere at levels that will reduce the likelihood of 
adverse effects from climate change.^ Countries that are party to the treaty are divided 
into Annex B and non-Annex parties. Annex B contains 39 members and includes
those parties that were members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
’’ The Kyoto Protocol does not aim to control the release o f  greenhouse gasses covered under the United  
Nations: P rotocol on Substances that D eplete the Ozone Layer, September 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 
(entered into force January 1, 1989) (hereinafter M ontreal P rotocol). Greenhouse gasses controlled under 
the Kyoto Protocol include Carbon D ioxide (CO?) and CO? equivalents. CO? equivalents include Methane 
(CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N ?0), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and Sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF^) [Annex A  to Kyoto Protocol],
*As defined in UNFCCC note 5 art. 1( 1) “adverse effects o f  climate change” are defined as “changes in 
the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious effects 
on the composition, resilience, or productivity o f  natural and managed ecosystem s or on the operation o f  
socio-econom ic systems or on human health and welfare.”
 ̂Aimex I refers to the Annex I o f  the UNFCCC Charter. Annex B refers to Aimex B o f  the Kyoto 
Protocol. The difference is slight but significant in some cases. See w w w .C 02e.com  for more details.
4
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Development (OECD) in 1992, as well as those countries in Eastern Europe whose 
economies were in transition to a market economy at that time. These countries were 
deemed to be “developed” in 1992 and subjected to legally binding obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol. Non-Annex B parties include the developing economies of the G-77.'®
As mentioned above, the Kyoto Protocol will come into effect 90 days after fifty-five 
parties to the United Nations Federation Convention on Climate Change have ratified the 
Protocol. Additionally, those 55 member signatures must account for at least 55% of the 
total Annex B CO2 emissions for 1990." Considering the emissions data for 1990, two of 
the three largest emitters, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the United 
States, will likely have to ratify the Kyoto Protocol for it to take effect.’^
2. Emission Reduction and Domestic Policy Requirements
The first commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol will be 2008-2012. During 
this time frame the overall goal is to reduce greenhouse gas" emissions from Annex B 
countries to 5% below 1990 levels. Eastern European, Annex B countries which are in 
transition to a market economy" will be allowed to use an alternate base year to
For a fiill list o f  Annex B countries see Appendix A, for explanation o f  the additional financial 
obligations for Non-Annex B countries see supra  note 1 art. 11.
" supra  1 art. 25(1)
'■ James T. Bryce, Controlling the Temperature: An Analysis o f  the Kyoto Protocol, 62 Saskatchewan Law 
R eview  379 (1999). As o f  September 2002 the European Union and the Russian Federation have ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, the Protocol has met its prerequisite and may. theoretically, enter into 
force. 
supra note I
These countries include Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
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determine emission baselines. Emissions from this base year shall be multiplied by five^^ 
to determine required emission reduction commitments.
The Kyoto Protocol requires parties to promote “sustainable development” 
through incorporation of various domestic policy measures into future planning and 
development. These measures include commitments to enhance energy efficiency, 
protect and create greenhouse gas s in k s,p ro m o te  sustainable agriculture, research and 
promote renewable energy and CO2 sequestration technologies, reduction and phase out 
of market imperfections’’ that run counter to the objectives of the UNFCCC, encourage 
policies aimed at greenhouse gas reductions, limit or reduce greenhouse gases emitted by 
the transportation sector, and limit or reduce methane emissions through recovery and use 
in waste management. The Kyoto Protocol also requires parties to share information with 
other members of the UNFCCC with respect to meeting their emission reduction 
commitments.
3. Flexibility Mechanisms
The Kyoto Protocol allows for three distinct flexibility mechanisms to assist 
Annex B parties in meeting their quantitative emission reduction commitments. The first 
of these flexibility mechanisms is joint implementation. ’ ̂  Under this mechanism two
The text o f  the Kyoto Protocol does not indicate how  the number five was determined. 
supra note 2 defines a sink as “any process or activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse 
gas...[from  the atmosphere]” i.e. oceans and forests 
i.e. “fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions, and subsidies on all greenhouse gas emitting sectors that 
run counter to the objective” o f  the UNFCCC. 
supra note 1 art. 4
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Annex B parties may jointly fulfill their commitments through a regional economic 
integration organization,'^ such as the European Economic Community (EEC), or by 
engaging jointly in projects aimed at reducing emissions. These projects involve one 
Annex B party transferring or acquiring emission reduction units (ERUs) created through 
these emission reduction activities in the partner country.^*^
The second flexibility mechanism allowed for under the Kyoto Protocol is closely 
related to the projects allowed for under joint implementation. This flexibility mechanism 
is emissions trading^' between Annex B nations. The premise of an emissions trading 
system is that such a system will create market incentives for parties to reduce emissions 
beyond their commitment levels through both domestic policy changes as well as through 
technology development. Additionally, an emissions trading system may reduce 
compliance costs, and create incentives for new technology development. The Kyoto 
Protocol will set a cap, or “assigned amount” to each Party which will dictate their 
emission reduction requirements. Annex B parties that reduce their COi, or CO? 
equivalent, emissions beyond their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, can sell that 
difference to another Annex B party in an open market system. The unit of such an 
emission reduction is called an assigned amount unit (AAU). These “projects” must 
create reductions in greenhouse gasses that are supplemental to domestic action. The 
Kyoto Protocol does not articulate any other significant differences between AAUs
a “regional economic integration organization” is defined by UNFCCC st4pra note 2 as “an organization 
constituted by sovereign States o f  a given region which has competence in respect to matters governed by 
this Convention or its protocols and has been duly authorized, in accordance with its internal procedures, to 
sign, ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the instruments concerned.”
Japan and Russia have already participated in such a “project.” See Bootleggers, Baptists, and  the 
G lobal Warming Battle. 26 Harvard Environmental Law Review  177 at 224.
■' Kyoto Protocol Article 17
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created through emissions trading and ERUs created through “projects” other than the
22Specification of the method though which the credit was created.
Lastly, the Kyoto Protocol allows for a Clean Development Mechanism (COM). 
The COM allows for non-Annex B parties^^ to create certified emission reductions 
(CERs) fi'om projects which reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These CERs can be used 
to offset emissions in Annex B nations in order to help Annex B nations to meet emission 
reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM is essentially the same as a 
“project” except that it involves an Annex B party acquiring CERs from a non-Annex B 
party.
2. Trade Restrictions Embedded in Trading Rules
The Kyoto Protocol itself does not lay out detailed rules surrounding the 
implementation of the above mentioned flexibility mechanisms, although the COP is 
currently negotiating these details. The Marrakech Accords^"^ outline many of the rules 
with respect to emissions trading. The Kyoto Protocol does specify, however, that Annex 
B parties may trade emission reduction units among themselves, and may trade in CERs 
with countries not included in Annex B that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol."^ Implicit
"  At C 0P 6  the Parties agreed that ERUs and A A U s are fully fungible (see UNCTAD -  Greenhouse Gas 
Trading -D R A FT ), therefore the term A A U  will be used throughout this paper to imply both ERUs and 
A A U s with respect to trading restrictions.
Non-Annex B parties engaging in CDM  transactions must be party to the Kyoto Protocol. Supra  note 1
The Marrakech Accords were negotiated at COP6 in 2000
Supra ! art. 6(1). Note that some authors speculate that the Kyoto Protocol will not prohibit Parties from 
selling A A U s to non-Party nations, only that they cannot buy A A U s from non-Party nations. See 
Bodansky, Daniel, Linking U.S. and International C lim ate Change Strategies, Pew  Center on Climate 
Change at 4, Baron, Richard and Pershing, Trading Greenhouse G ases Outside Kyoto, International
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in this language is that Annex B parties may not trade with any non-parties to meet 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. It is anticipated that the final emissions trading 
rules will, as negotiated in the Marrakech Accords, explicitly mirror this restriction.
B. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)^*/ World Trade
Organization (WTO)
1. Overview
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was negotiated by the Conference 
of Parties in 1947. The goal o f this agreement was to encourage economic development 
by easing restrictions and liberalizing trade among contracting parties. Central to the 
agreement are three core principles; Most Favored Nation, National Treatment, and 
Prohibition on Import/Export Restrictions. Article I of the GATT outlines the Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) principle. Under the MFN principle each party agrees to accord 
unconditional equal treatment to all other member n a tions.T here fo re , no party may 
grant any privilege with respect to any imported product to any other party without giving 
those same privileges, with respect to “like products” to all other GATT/WTO parties. 
Article III o f the GATT outlines the national treatment principle which requires that 
foreign goods imported to member states be treated in the same manner as “like
Energy Agency, at 2, and Diringer, Elliot, Two Scenarios: Linking U.S. and International Climate Change 
Efforts, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, at 3 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U .N.T.S. 187 (1947) [hereinafter GATT].
Specifically the text o f  the GATT outlining the M FN principle states that:
any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity, granted by any contracting party to a product 
originating in ...an y  other country shall be accorded im m ediately and unconditionally to the like 
products originating...in all other contracting parties.
“like products” are not defined in the GATT
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products” produced doinestically. In other words, this provision limits and/or eliminates 
economic advantages for domestically produced products over imported products.^^ 
Lastly, Articles XI and XIII o f the GATT govern the prohibition on import/export 
restrictions. Articles XI and XIII prohibit the use o f quantitative “prohibitions or 
restrictions,” such as bans, quotas and import licenses, on imports from member 
countries.
In 1995 the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established, and signed by 
over 100 member countries at the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Many new 
agreements were negotiated as annexes to the WTO. These annexes include multilateral 
agreements dealing with trade in goods,^’ services, and intellectual property.^^ These 
annexes include the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade o f 1994. The GATT 1994 
incorporated many but not all o f the provisions o f the GATT 1947. The WTO was 
established to “implement and administer the operations, and further the objectives’’̂  ̂of 
the agreements defined therein. Additionally, the WTO must resolve disputes under its 
agreements,^"^ and must review all trade policy o f member nations.
Specifically the text o f  GATT outling the national treatment principle states that the imports fi’om any 
contracting party:
be accorded treatment no less favorable than that to like products o f  national origin in respect to all 
laws, regulations, and requirements affecting their internal sale.
GATT Article XI{1) specifically states:
N o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether m ade effective  
through quotas, import, or export licenses, or other m easures, shall be instituted or maintained by 
any other contracting party on the importation o f  any product o f  the territory o f  any other contracting 
party.
”  WTO Committees on Trade and the Environment, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and Technical 
Barriers to Trade.
A s covered by General Agreement on Trade in Services [hereinafter GATS] and Trade Related aspects o f  
Intellectual Property [hereinafter TRIPS]
Ralph Folsom, International Trade and Investment in a Nutshell, at 67
It is important to note that only the governments o f  WTO members have standing to request dispute 
settlement and participate in the adjudicative process. Additionally, WTO dispute settlement panel hearings 
and negotiations are done behind closed doors and are not open to the public.
10
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2. Exceptions to Trade Restriction under the GA TT
Article XX Sections (b) and (g) o f the GATT provide some exceptions to allow 
trade restrictions under specific conditions relating to environmental conservation and 
protection/^ Article XX provides a legal pathway for trade measures that would 
otherwise be in conflict with GATT obligations, to deviate from those obligations. The 
following conditions must be met in order for GATT Article XX to apply to a particular 
trade restriction:
• It is necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health^^ or;
• they relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if  such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption,^^
Trade measures meeting the above conditions may be exempt from conflicting GATT 
obligations as long as they do not constitute:
• a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail; or
• a disguised restriction on international trade.
Although the word “environment" is never actually used  
supra note 26  art.XX(b) 
supra note 26  art. X X (g)
These requirements are called for in the chapeau to GATT Article XX
1 1
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Unfortunately, as will be discussed below, in the event o f conflict, GATTAVTO tribunals 
have tended to favor the interests of free trade over those of environmental protection.
C. The North American Free Trade Agreement^^
1. Overview
Free trade negotiations between the U.S. and Canada dates back to the Elgin- 
Marcy Treaty of 1854. The Elgin-Marcy Treaty established free trade between the two 
countries for virtually all products as well as opened up access to mutual fisheries. In 
1866 the U.S. pulled out of the Elgin-Marcy Treaty and trade negotiations between the 
two countries was put on hold for nearly 70 years. President Roosevelt was the first to 
resume negotiations, but he was unsuccessful in his attempt to negotiate a free trade 
agreement between the two countries."^® The two countries did, however, participate in 
the GATT of 1947. This agreement served as an alternative until the Canada-United 
States Free Trade Agreement"*' went into effect on January 1, 1989. The CFTA both 
borrowed from the existing GATT of 1947,"*̂  as well as helped lay the groundwork for 
the NAFTA.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec 17, 1992, Can-M ex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (1993) 
[hereinafter NAFTA],
Although Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1935, under which tariffs were 
substantially reduced between U.S.-Canadian trade, Canadian Prime Minister King declined to support the 
agreement.
hereinafter CFTA
i.e. CFTA transposed GATT’s art. X X  exceptions into it's text
12
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The NAFTA, negotiated by President George Bush in the early 1990s, then modified 
and signed into law by President Bill Clinton on January 1, 1994, was developed to create 
a free trade area between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. It was designed to 
integrate the economies of Mexico, Canada, and the U.S. while keeping the political 
barriers firmly in place."^  ̂The treaty was closely modeled after the GATT/WTO" '̂* in its 
central goals of decreasing quantitative restrictions to trade through the decrease and 
elimination of trade barriers such as tariffs, taxes, and import licenses. The elimination 
of the risk o f U.S. imposed taxes and tariffs on imported goods was particularly attractive 
to Mexico at the time due to their heavy economic reliance on market access to the U.S. 
with 75% of their export market going to U.S. consumers."*^
The NAFTA contains several core objectives as defined in Article 102. They include 
the following;
• Reduction and/or elimination of trade barriers (i.e. sanctions, taxes, tariffs)
• Creation of conditions of regional fair competition
• Increase investment opportunities
• Protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
• Procedures for the implementation and application of the NAFTA, including 
methodology for settlement of disputes; and
• Framework for further regional and multilateral cooperation to enhance the 
benefits of the NAFTA
see Ralph Folsom, NAFTA in a Nutshell, W est Law 1999 
** see Table I below  
supra note 41
13
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Immediately following the implementation of the NAFTA in 1994, trade and foreign 
investment between the three countries increased dramatically. The economic boost is 
particularly evident in the case of trade between the U.S. and Mexico. U.S. exports to 
Mexico increased by 21.1%, imports from Mexico were up 24% in 1994, and in 1995 
U.S. investment in Mexico reached an all time high.'*^ However, despite its economic 
advantages, like the GATT/WTO, the agreement has been widely criticized for its lack o f 
social and environmental protection measures.'*^ For example, after the passage o f the 
NAFTA many U.S. based companies moved to Mexico to take advantage of the lower 
labor costs and standards as well as more lenient environmental protection regulations 
relative to the U.S. equivalents. Prior to the NAFTA, import restrictions made this 
method of production less profitable.
see David Gantz, Implementing the NAFTA Rules o f  Origin: A re the P arties H elping or Hurting Free 
Trade? 12 Arizona Journal o f  International Comparative Law 367 (1995)
However, in some political spheres, the N A FTA  has been recognized as having taken a step forward 
from the GATTAVTO with respect to environmental provisions. For a more detailed discussion o f  this 
issue, see Richard Steinberg, Trade-Environment N egotiations in the E. U., NAFTA, and WTO: R egional 
Trajectories o f  Rule D evelopm ent, 91 American Journal o f  International Law 231 (1997). Steinberg also 
advocates, using the WTO, NAFTA, and the European Union as an example, that the closer the econom ic 
integration achieved in an international trade agreements the more environmentally friendly the resulting 
regulations w ill be:
The extent to w hich the rules and institutions o f  organizations are environment friendly correlated 
with the rank-ordering o f  the depth o f  integration in the trade organizations examined. An analysis 
o f  the process o f  trade-environmenl rulemaking in each o f  the three trade organizations has 
confirmed that the deepening o f  integration has increased the salience o f  trade-environment issues 
for richer, greener states and has led to dem ands by those states for m ore environm ent-friendly rules 
and institutions.
B y this reasoning i f  the NAFTA's trade measures moved towards even more liberalization o f  trade, the U.S. 
being the richest, “greenest” party would subsequently be able to demand more stringent environmental 
regulations. Unfortunately, under the current administration I would argue that this is highly unlikely.
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N A FTA W T O
Chapter 3: Trade in Goods GATT 1994, Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing
Chapter 4; Rules o f  Origin Agreement on Rules o f  Origin
Chapter 5: Customs Procedures N o parallel but see Customs Valuation 
Code
Chapter 6 ; Energy and Basic 
Petrochemicals
N o parallel
Chapter 7: Agriculture and SPS Measure Agreement on Agriculture, Agreement on 
SPS Measures
Chapter 8 : Emergency Action Agreement on Safeguards
Chapter 9; Product and Safety Standards Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade
Chapter 10: Procurement Agreement on Government Procurement
Chapter 11 : Investment Agreement on Trade Related Investment 
Measures
Chapter 12: Cross-Border Trade in 
Services
General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS)
Chapter 13: Enhanced 
telecommunications
See GATS, Basic Telecommunications 
Covered
Chapter 14: Financial Services See GATS
Chapter 15: Competition Policy, 
M onopolies, and State Enterprises
N o parallel, but see Understanding on  
Interpretation o f  GATT Article XVII
Chapter 16: Temporary Entry for 
Business Persons
N o parallel
Chapter 17: Intellectual Property Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects o f  
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
Chapter 18: Administrative Provisions N ot applicable
Chapter 19: Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Dispute Settlement
N o parallel, but see D SU  and Agreement 
on Implementation o f  GATT Article VI
Chapter 20: Dispute Settlement Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement o f  Disputes 
(DSU)
Chapter 21 : Exceptions See GATT Articles XX, Xxi and 
Understanding on GATT Balance o f  
Payment Provisions
A greem ent on E nvironm ental 
C ooperation
No parallel
A greem ent on L abor C ooperation No parallel
Table 1 C om parison o f N A FT A  and W T O  Requirem ents'48
48 This table was taken directly from Folsom (1999) Pgs 73-74
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2. Trade-Environment Conflicts Under the NAFTA
With respect to trade-environment conflicts under the NAFTA, four categories have 
gained significant attention in recent years;'*^
•  Domestic health, safety and environmental protection -  Governments are 
restricted in their ability to impose domestic standards on imported goods to 
protect the public health or the environment.^*^
• Extrajurisdictional activity: endangered species, foreign pollution, and the "race 
to the bottom Governments are concerned about their ability to place 
restrictions on imports based on their commitments to address environmental 
concerns through other treaties,^' or as determined by production processes. 
Additionally, many sectors are concerned about the effect o f the “race to the 
bottom”^̂  which describes competition among nations to loosen environmental 
regulations, and labor standards in order to attract investment from foreign 
companies.
• Transboundary Remediation- As free trade increases, product transportation 
traffic increases in border regions. In efforts to minimize costs, border regions
234
see GATT dispute panel report, United States -  Restrictions on Imports o f  Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) 
[hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin II\.
i.e. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species o f  W ild Flora and Fauna, March 3, 1973, 
27 UST 1087, 993 UNTS 243 [hereinafter CITES] 
i.e. freedom to utilize the concept o f  a pollution tax -  taxing products based on the amount o f  pollution 
created during production- is restricted, 
see Daniel Etsy, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment and the Future (1994)
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become areas of high industrial activity. Thus border regions see extremely high 
levels of environmental degradation in countries with loose environmental 
standards. This problem has been highlighted in the case o f the U.S.- Mexico 
border maquiladora^'^ region.
•  Trade- Environment Institutions- International trade agreements often create or 
modify existing institutions to analyze and/or adjudicate^^ issues relating to 
environmental concems.^^ As liberalization of trade increases, the ability o f these 
institutions to perform their duties in compliance with the trade agreements that 
created them comes into question.
3. Exceptions to Trade Restrictions Under the NAFTA
The NAFTA allows for many of the same exceptions, allowing for trade 
restrictions under specific circumstances, as the WTO/GATT. However, the NAFTA 
has been considered more environment-friendly than the WTO/GATT because it adds 
additional allowances for environmental protection related exemptions. The sections 
of NAFTA that may potentially address environmental issues are covered in NAFTA
^  The maquiladora program w as established by the M exican government in 1965 and allows duty-free 
imports o f  manufacturing components to M exico for processing or assembly o f  products that must 
subsequently be exported from M exico. For more detailed discussions o f  the maquiladora program see 
Leonard Novaro, B order Towns M ired in Toxic Waste, 11 Pac. Mtn. Network N ew s 2-3 (Rural Community 
Assistance Corp., Sacramento, CA) (Aug. 1993); Kristi Fettig Criminal and C ivil Rem edies fo r  
Transboundary Water Pollution, 15 Transnational Law 117 (2002);
and Lesley J. W isem an^ P lace for "Maternity’" in the G lobal Workplace, 28 Ohio N.V.L. Rev. 195 
(2001).
Note that like the WTO dispute resolution process, with the exception o f  N A FTA  Chapter 11 dealing  
with foreign investment, for all other issues, the NAFTA only grants standing to member governments, 
and deliberations are not open to the public.
^  i.e. WTO Committees on Trade and the Environment, Sanitary and Phytosanitary M easures, and 
Technical Barriers to Trade, and N A FT A ’s Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)
17
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Chapter 21, Chapter l(art. 104), and the North American Agreement for 
Environmental Cooperation. Each of these is described below: 
• NAFTA Chapter 21- The text o f Chapter 21 of the NAFTA defers specifically to 
Article XX of the GATT/WTO. It says that for the purposes of trade in goods, 
with the exception of provisions relating to services and investment:
GATT Article XX and its interpretive notes, or any equivalent provision of 
a successor agreement to which all Parties are party, are incorporated into 
and made part of this Agreement. The Parties understand that the 
measures referred to in GATT Article XX(b)^’ include environmental 
measures necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, and 
that GATT Article XX(g)^* applies to measures relating to the 
conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural resources.
The chapeau to GATT Article XX dictates that these provisions apply as long 
as they are applied in a manner that does not:
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on 
international trade between the Parties.
Historically, these exceptions have been interpreted very narrowly 59
GATT art. XX(b) states that trade may be restricted when “necessary to protect human, animal, or plant 
life or health.”
GATT art. XX(g) states that trade may be restricted “relating to the conservation o f  exhaustible natural 
resources i f  such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.”
Thomas, Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection o f  the Environment: the Continuing Search 
fo r  Reconciliation, 91 American Journal o f  International Law 268 (1997)
18
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NAFTA Chapter 1- Article 104 of NAFTA Chapter 1 includes exemptions unique 
to the NAFTA. It specifies that in the event of any inconsistency between the 
NAFTA and any other such agreement, the NAFTA will prevail except when one 
of the listed Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) exists.
Additionally, Article 104.1 sets out that additional MEAs may be added to the list 
provided that it is agreed upon in writing by the parties involved. The currently 
listed MEAs include: (a)CITES;^° (b) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer;^^ (c) the Basel Convention on the Control o f 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal;^^ (d) the 
agreements set forth in Annex 104.1. Article 104 specifies that these conditions 
will prevail when inconsistencies arise provided that “where a Party has a choice 
among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with such 
obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is least inconsistent with the 
other provisions of this Agreement.”
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.^^ The NAAEC, also 
known as the environmental side agreement, was negotiated by the Clinton 
Administration to gain support for the NAFTA from environmental 
organizations.^ The NAAEC requires member countries to effectively enforce
supra  note 51
signed in Montreal on September 16, 1987, amended 1990 [hereinafter the M ontreal Protocol] 
signed in Basel on March 22, 1989 [hereinafter the Basel Convention] (the U.S. has not yet ratified this 
agreement)
Implemented with the NAFTA on January 1, 1994 [hereinafter C]
^  The environmental community was markedly split in its support o f  the N A FTA  with organizations such 
as the National W ildlife Federation, the World W ildlife Fund, the Environmental D efense Fund, the 
Natural Resources D efense Council, the National Audubon Society firmly in favor and other organizations 
such as the Sierra Club, Friends o f  the Earth, Greenpeace, the Humane Society, Clean Water Action,
19
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their own environmental laws, prohibits them from lowering their environmental 
standards, and requires them to try to improve them. It also created the 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) through which citizens have 
standing to have their complaints heard with regard to a party’s failure to enforce 
its environmental regulations. The text prohibiting parties from lowering their 
environmental regulations to attract industry is not subject to panel review and 
therefore has not proven to be very effective. The CEC can reject a complaint by a 
two-thirds vote, and similarly will only release the Secretariat’s report to the 
public on a heard complaint by a two-thirds vote. Lastly, the agreement provides 
for sanctions against any country that is found to have engaged in a “persistent 
pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental laws.’’̂  ̂Although the 
NAAEC deserves mention as a small step forward with respect to environmental 
protection under international trade agreements, to date it has not proven 
particularly effective in its goals. However, it does create the potential for a safe 
harbor in which Canada may impose environmental protection measures related to 
climate change protected under the NAAEC. This will be discussed in greater 
length in Section VII below.^
Rainforest Action, the American Society for the Prevention o f  Cruelty to Animals, Environmental Action 
and many other strongly opposed to the treaty. See Andres Rueda, Tuna, Dolphins, Shrimp, Turtles: 
What About Environmental Em bargoes Under NAFTA? 12 The Georgetown International Environmental 
Law Review 647 (2000)
John Knox, NAFTA's Environmental Provisions: Vl îat Problem s were they Intended to A ddress?  23 
Canada-U.S. Journal 403 (1997)
For further discussion about the NAAEC see ibid, and David S. Baron, NAFTA and the Environment- 
M aking the Side Agreem ent Work, 12 Arizona Journal o f  International and Comparative Law 603 (1995)
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III. MEAs vs. International Trade Agreements
Although to date there have not been any documented disputes 
surrounding conflicting obligations under International Trade Agreements and 
MEAs, the potential for such a conflict has made this issue the subject o f much 
discussion.^^ Besides the Kyoto Protocol, a number of MEAs have called for 
trade measures that may be deemed in conflict with the provisions of 
GATT/WTO and/or NAFTA. These include the CITES,^® the Basel 
Convention,^’ and the Montreal Protocol.^’ Neither the WTO/GATT nor NAFTA 
have rules governing the mode of dispute resolution under such circumstances 
presumably because until recently they had not been pressured to do so.
A. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’^
In the event of a conflict between an International Trade Agreement and a 
MEA, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties offers some direction.
see Charles Fletcher, Greening World Trade: Reconciling GATT and M ultilateral Environmental 
Agreem ents within the Existing W orld Trading Regime, 5 Journal o f  Transnational Law and Policy 341 ; 
Chris W old, M ultilateral Environm ental Agreem ents and the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 
Environmental Law 841 ; and Ryan Winter, R econciling the GATT and WTO with M ultilateral 
Environmental Agreem ents: Can we H ave our Cake and Eat it Too?, 11 Colorado Journal o f  
Environmental Law and Policy 223 (2000) 
supra  note 51; CITES restricts the import and export o f  endangered species 
^  supra  note 62; The Basel Convention regulates the import and export o f  hazardous wastes.
Supra note 61; The Montreal Protocol regulates the trade o f  substances that deplete the ozone layer. 
GATT created bodies such as the Group in Environmental Measures and International Trade (GEMIT) 
and the Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE) have thus far failed in their efforts to establish 
rules clearly governing how to resolve conflicts between M EAs and GATT. See Bill O ’Connor, Trade and  
the Environment: An Update on the GATT Agenda, 4 Eur. Envtl. L. Rev. 20, and Report o f  the WTO  
Committee on Trade and the Environment Novem ber 14, 1996 PRESS/TE 014 (1996)
Vienna Convention o f  the Law o f  Treaties, M ay 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter the Vienna 
Convention or the Convention]
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Article 30 of the Vienna Convention states the rules for two broad scenarios. The 
first involves a conflict between two nations that are both party to the 
International Trade Agreement and to the MEA. Under this scenario, the terms of 
the most recent agreement will prevail over the earlier agreement. Furthermore, 
under this scenario, the Vienna Convention contains the rule o f lex specialis, 
which allows for a more specific treaty to supercede a less specific treaty when 
the two relate to the same issue, irrespective of the date o f the two treaties. The 
second scenario is one in which both countries involved in a dispute belong to one 
agreement but only one party belongs to the second agreement. The Vienna 
Convention is clear that under such conditions the agreement to which both 
nations are member will g o v e rn .C le a rly , the second scenario describes the rule 
which would govern the issue addressed in this paper. Therefore, the following 
discussion will cover how such a dispute would be analyzed Irom the position of a 
WTO or NAFTA dispute resolution panel.
IV. Emission Reduction Units Classified as “Products”
Predicting the WTO and/or NAFTA classification of ERUs is a daunting task. 
There is no precedent for classification of AAUs or any similar instrument under the
The Vienna Convention does not stipulate how to determine the official “date” o f  an agreement in the 
case o f  amendments made to one or more o f  the conflicting agreements.
See Winter supra note 67
.Sgg zW. at 238
Per the rules described above, in the case o f  a trade dispute between the U.S. and Canada, NAFTA will 
supercede the WTO. However, due to the lack o f  case law on similar issues under NAFTA, as well as due 
to the potential breath o f  this discussion as it applies to other WTO member nations which are non-Kyoto 
Protocol members this paper w ill cover WTO/GATT case law as it relates to N A FTA  requirements.
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WTO or the NAFTA.^’ The limited published work on the topic^^ reveals arguments both 
in favor o f and against the classification of AAUs as “products.” Werksman recognizes 
the potential for their classification as “products” because AAUs will have a market value 
and may therefore be considered a “commodity.” However, he goes on to argue that this 
classification is unlikely because historically WTO panels have interpreted “products” to 
be “tangible goods.”^̂  Other authors repeatedly refer to AAUs as tradable 
‘commodities’ but do not offer any guidelines for use of this term.^° Nevertheless, 
because the possibility does exist for AAUs to be classified as “products,” this paper will 
nevertheless discuss the potential implications of such a classification. Specifically, this 
paper will discuss the potential for Canada to exclude non-Kyoto Protocol nation derived 
AAUs from Canada’s domestic trading market through statutory authority or exclusion. 
The following section will focus on the possibility for legal statutory exclusion o f non- 
Party derived AAUs by way GATT and NAFTA exemptions.
A. Historical Dispute Resolution: Statutory Exclusion
In the event that Canada ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, it is likely that Canada will 
incorporate the Protocol into domestic law through statute. If this is to occur, the trade 
restrictions contained in the Kyoto Protocol, limiting use of, and trade in AAUs fi-om 
non-Party nations, may be effectively viewed as a unilateral trade sanction. Unilateral
See supra  note 4 at 255
^ See supra  note 4 and Tania Voon, Sizing Up the FfU'O: Trade-Environment Conflict and the Kvoto  
Protocol, 10 Journal o f  Transnational Law and Policy 1 (2000) at 93 However, I will not refer to Tania 
V oon s argument because she incorrectly represents W erksman's argument in her citation o f  his work (at 
93), leading me to question her authority on this topic. 
supra  note 4 at 255
See Rosenweig et. al., The Emerging International Greenhouse Gas Market, Pew  Center on Global 
Climate Change, at iv, 2, 3, and Diringer at 3
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trade sanctions refer to internal regulations or trade barriers imposed by one country that 
affect the importation of goods or services o f one or more other countries. At first glace 
it would appear that such a sanction would be impermissible under NAFTA or the 
GATT/WTO rules. However, it is possible for a unilateral sanction to be placed on an 
exporting party’s goods if  the conditions fall under one o f the NAFTA or GATT/WTO 
exemptions described in Section II.(B) and (C)*  ̂ above, i.e. those restrictions do not 
constitute arbitrary, or unjustifiable discrimination, they are necessary for the protection 
of human, animal or plant life or health, or they relate to the conservation of an 
exhaustible natural resource under NAFTA Chapter 21.
In the case of a trade dispute between Canada and the U.S., a NAFTA panel would 
likely hear the case rather than a WTO panel.H ow ever, a NAFTA panel has yet to rule 
on a trade dispute based on imposition of a unilateral trade sanction. Therefore, because 
the relevant environmental provisions are identical under NAFTA and the G ATT/WTO, 
the following discussion will focus on how these types of disputes have been historically 
decided by WTO panels.
Dispute resolution panels will tend to employ similar methodology in interpreting 
GATT Article XX(b) and (g). In interpreting Article XX(b) the panel will often ask three 
questions in order to determine applicability: (1) Is the substance of the measure in
NAFTA also provides exceptions for National Security protection and Canadian and M exican Cultural 
Industries. These w ill not be discussed in this paper.
As governed by the Geneva Convention on Treaties, in the case o f  a discrepancy between two 
multilateral agreements, the later treaty to which all parties involved in the dispute are signatories shall be 
given deference. 
supra  note 59 at 276
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question the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health?; (2) Is the measure 
necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health?; and (3) Is the measure 
applied in such a manner so as to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and/or a 
disguised restriction on international trade? The operative language is the word 
“necessary,” which can be interpreted in one of two ways. First, “necessary” can take the 
“protection of human, animal, or plant life or health” as its object, and therefore be 
interpreted to mean that the measure taken is necessary for the protection of that object. 
Alternatively, it can be interpreted to mean that the measure is a necessary departure 
from the GATT because it “entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT 
provisions.” The latter of these two interpretations has been favored by recent GATT 
panels.*'*
Mirroring the methodology employed in interpreting Article XX(b), interpretation of 
GATT Article XX(g) has often been carried out by dispute resolution panels based on the 
following analysis: (1) Is the measure related to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources?; (2) Does the specific measure relate to the protection of exhaustible natural 
resources?; (3) Are the invoked measures made in conjunction with identical domestic 
measures or restrictions?; and (4) Are the measures applied in accordance with the 
chapeau of Article XX?*^ In answering these questions, the phrase “relating to” has 
sometimes been interpreted to mean that the measure is “primarily aimed at”*̂
S4 ■
i.e. Thailand- Restrictions on Importation o f  and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, November 7, 1990 30 
I.L.M. 1122
85 supra  note 59 at 277
see Canada -  Measures Affecting Exports o f  Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, March 22, 1988 GATT  
B.I.S.D . (35"’ Supp.)98 (1988)
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conservation. However, as seen below in the U.S. Gasoline Standards panel decision, 
the scope of this interpretation has also been significantly limited through an alternate 
more narrow interpretation of the phrase “relating to” to mean “necessary or essential.”
In addition to direct interpretations of GATT Article XX(b) and (d), the question 
of extraterritoriality has also been subject to review and interpretation with respect to 
unilateral trade sanctions. The history o f this interpretation will be discussed in relation 
to the conflicting interpretations of the panels that heard Tuna /Dolphin 1** and 11*̂  as 
discussed below.
Cases taken to WTO dispute resolution panels^*  ̂have challenged unilateral sanctions 
imposed by member nations which claimed that the imposed measures fell under one or 
more of the exceptions described above. Five of these cases are described below. Panel 
decisions are not binding on future panels, and therefore do not offer concrete guidelines 
or arguments for future dispute settlement. However, they do offer a glimpse at the 
trends in interpretation of the law that we can expect under similar circumstances. One 
such circumstance may be a Canadian sanction on U.S. created AAUs.
1. Tuna / Dolphin I and II Cases
United States -  Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996) 
[hereinafter U.S. Gasoline Standards]
^  United States -  Restrictions on Imports o f  Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1598 (1992) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin /] 
United States -  Restrictions on Imports o f  Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin II]
^  To date, parallel disputes have not been decided by a NAFTA panel, however because the same 
exceptions being challenged above also apply under N A FTA  these decisions can be assumed to be 
indicative o f  a NAFTA panel decision as well. However, it is important to note that dispute resolutions are 
not formally binding to future panel decisions under GATT/W TO or NAFTA.
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i) Historical Overview
The “purse-seine” method is commonly used by fishing fleets worldwide to fish 
for tuna. The method involves the release o f a large net, up to a mile long^' that traps 
tuna and whatever else happens to be in the vicinity. Because dolphins tend to follow 
tuna, fishermen commonly search out the more visible dolphins to determine where to 
throw their nets. As a result, thousands of dolphins^^ are trapped and killed in the nets 
each year. In response to citizen concern over the fate o f dolphins and other marine 
mammals the U.S. Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act o f 1972^^ 
(MMPA). The MMPA was designed to protect dolphins by regulating domestic fishing 
techniques and imposing an embargo on foreign countries that did not conform to these 
regulations. The MMPA placed an embargo on tuna and tuna products from foreign 
nations that were harvested in a manner that is harmful to dolphins until such time as the 
Secretary of Commerce certifies that the incidental kill rate o f dolphins for a particular 
nation is in compliance with U.S. standards.^"^ The MMPA also placed an embargo on 
intermediary nations^^ that imported tuna or tuna products from a country that harvests
supra  note 64
An average o f  300,000 dolphins are killed by fishermen each year by U.S. fishing fleets alone. See supra  
note 64 at 648. In the 1950"s at the height o f  the use o f  the purse-seine method m illions o f  dolphins were 
netted and killed along with tuna. See Joseph Urgese, D olphin Protection and the M ammal Protection A ct 
H ave M et Their M atch: The G eneral A greem ent on Tariffs and  Trade, 31 AJcron Law R eview  457 (1998) at 
464
16 U.S.C. §1361-1407 (1985) [hereinafter MMP.4], as amended by the International Dolphin 
Conservation Program Act, 111 Stat. 1122 (1997) [hereinafter IDCPA]
^  16 U.S.C. §1371 (a)(2)(B )(ii)(l) (1997) provides that “the average rate o f  incidental taking by vessels o f  
the harvesting nation is no more than 2.0 times that o f  United States vessels during the same period by the 
end o f  the 1989 fishing season and no more than 1.25 times that o f  United States vessels during the same 
period by the end o f  the 1990 fishing season and thereafter.” See supra  note 92 at 465  
“[T]he term ‘intermediary nation’ means a nation that exports yellowfin tuna or yellow fin tuna products 
to the United States and that also imports yellow fin or yellow fin tuna products that are subject to a direct 
ban on importation into the United States pursuant to section 1371(a)(2)(B) o f  this title.” See MM PA § 
1362(5)
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tuna in a manner that is harmful to dolphins. The unilateral sanctions imposed by the 
MMPA have been challenged a number o f times under GATT/WTO. As seen in the 
discussion below, the challenges were made citing GATT law that is replicated under the 
NAFTA. Therefore, the panel interpretations of the law are noteworthy in analyzing the 
potential for a Canadian sanction against U.S. created AAUs to fall under one of the 
corresponding NAFTA exceptions.
ii) Tuna/Dolphin I  Dispute
In 1991 Mexico requested that a GATT Dispute Resolution Panel be assembled^^ 
to reconcile the disparity between the sanctions imposed by MMPA and U.S. trade 
obligations under GATT. Mexico claimed that MMPA conflicted with the GATT 
Article 111 (“national treatment obligation” o f imported “like products”), and Article 
XI (prohibiting quantitative restrictions). Additionally, Mexico claimed that the 
MMPA did not fall under any of the Article XX exceptions. Mexico argued that 
Article XX(b) did not apply, this meant that the embargo was not “necessary” to the 
protection of dolphin life and health because alternative means, such as international 
cooperation through MEAs, consistent with the GATT, were available to protect 
dolphin life and health. Additionally, Mexico argued that Article XX(g) was 
inapplicable because the U.S. was not primarily concerned with the protection of 
dolphins, and that the measure was designed to create a disguised barrier to 
international trade.
^  Pursuant to their rights under GATT Article XXII:2
28
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The panel found Article III inapplicable because it only applies to “products,” not 
“processes.”^̂  They argued that tuna taken by purse-seine methods are the same as 
tuna taken by any other method and are therefore “like products” which cannot be 
discriminated between. Therefore, because the MMPA was regulating “process” o f 
harvesting tuna and not the “product” itself, the Act did not fall into the scope of 
Article III. Furthermore, the Panel found that the MMPA did not qualify for 
exemption under any o f the Article XX provisions. Their decision hinged on the 
interpretation of two key issues. The first was the use of the word “necessary,” as 
discussed above. The panel interpreted the “necessary” requirement o f Article XX(b) 
to “refer to the trade measures requiring justification under Article XX(b), [and] 
not.. .to the life or health standard chosen by the contracting party.”’  ̂Effectively this 
meant that a nation can impose unilateral sanctions to protect the life and health of 
humans, animals, or plants only it has have exhausted all other alternatives. The 
panel decided that the U.S. had not done this, and therefore the policy measure was 
not “necessary.”^
The second issue of interpretation related to the ability o f a nation to apply 
unilateral sanctions extraterri tori ally, or the ability of the U.S. to impose regulations 
that were effective outside U.S. geographical ju r isd ic tio n .T h e  panel ruled that 
although these were not disguised trade restrictions, natural resources and living
Although the panel did not officially rule on Article III it stated that even i f  the U.S. had solely regulated 
the sale o f  tuna products internally, it still would have been in violation o f  Article III(4)’s national 
treatment mandate based on inconsistencies between requirements for domestic and foreign vessels. 
supra  note 92 at 477
^  Some argue that this decision ignored the fact that the U.S. had been engaged in negotiations to establish 
an M EA to protect dolphin life and health for approximately forty years. See Steve Charaovitz, Dolphins 
and Tuna: An Analysis o f  the Second GATT Panel Report, 24 Environmental Law Reporter (1994)
Not to be confused with extrajurisdictionality see ?????Shoenberg? LOOK UP LATER
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things'®' could only be protected under those provisions which were within the 
geographical jurisdiction o f the country concerned. Similarly, in its interpretation of 
Article XX(g), the panel ruled that a party can impose “trade measures primarily 
aimed at conservation of exhaustible natural resources solely within their own 
jurisdiction.'®^ This meant that the U.S. was unjustified in imposing unilateral 
sanctions aimed at conserving dolphins in areas under Mexican jurisdiction. Because 
Article XX did not apply the panel ruled that the U.S. was in violation o f Article XI 
o f the GATT.'®^ The panel stated that although parties can impose regulations 
affecting the internal sale of products, they could not place restrictions on the 
processes by which those products were produced.
Hi) Tuna/Dolphin II  Dispute
In 1992 the European Economic Community (EEC), later joined by the 
Netherlands, filed a request for a WTO panel to review a similar issue with respect to 
EEC and Dutch fishing fleets. The EEC and the Netherlands challenged the 
intermediary nation embargo contained in §1371(a)(2)(C) o f the MMPA.'®'' They 
claimed that it violated Article XI o f GATT,'®^ and that it was not an internal 
regulation permitted under GATT Article III. Thirdly, the EEC and the Netherlands
i.e. humans, animals, and plants pursuant to GATT Article XX(b)
However, as we w ill see in Tuna/Dolphin II there is no language that limits the scope o f  a parties actions 
to their own territories.
This panel decision was never carried out due to political reasons surrounding the anticipated adoption 
o f  the NAFTA. M exico’s rejection o f  the decision was w idely view ed at a diplomatic measure aimed at 
urging U.S. Congress to pass the NAFTA. The U.S. and M exico independently negotiated terms o f  an 
agreement surrounding the tuna/dolphin issue.
As described above, the intermediary nation clause o f  M M PA placed an embargo on all nations that 
imported tuna or tuna products from a nation that may be subject to the direct U.S. tuna embargo.
Article XI o f  GATT prohibits quantitative restrictions on imported goods from member nations.
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argued that GATT Article XX was inapplicable because the measures were taken 
outside U.S. jurisdiction. The U.S. claimed that the embargo was protected under 
GATT Articles XX(b),(g), and (d).'°^
The panel found that the intermediary nation embargo was not a justifiable 
measure “relating to the enforcement at the time or point o f importation o f an internal 
law, regulation, or requirement that applied equally to the imported product and the 
like domestic product.” Therefore, the panel ruled that the intermediary embargo 
was in violation of GATT Article III. The panel further ruled that because the 
embargo was in violation o f Article III, it also violated Article XI’s quantitative 
restriction prohibition.
The panel’s analysis o f Article XX is o f particular interest. In its analysis o f 
Article XX(g), the panel imposed a three prong analysis similar to that described 
above in Section IV (A). First, the panel affirmed that dolphins are in fact an 
exhaustible resource and that the U.S. policy was indeed a measure designed at 
conserving that resource. Mirroring the argument adopted by Mexico in 
Tuna/Dolphin I, the EEC and the Netherlands argued that even if  dolphins are an 
exhaustible natural resource, the U.S. could not impose its regulations 
extraterritorially to protect them. Unlike the decision in Tuna/Dolphin I, the panel 
disagreed and ruled that there was nothing in the text of the GATT to limit the scope 
of a protective measure to a nation’s own ju risd ic tio n ,fin d in g  “no valid reason for
Article XX(d) as amended in 1994 states that nothing in the GATT agreement shall prevent parties from 
imposing measures:
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not consistent with the 
provisions o f  this Agreement, including those relating to the customs enforcement, the 
enforcement o f  m onopolies.. the protection o f  patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the 
prevention o f  deceptive practices.” 
see GATT Article I II
This decision was reinforced by general international law principles which state that with respect to 
natural resources outside their territory “states are not in principle barred from regulating the conduct o f  
their nationals.”
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supporting the conclusion [reached by the Tuna/Dolphin I WTO dispute resolution 
panel] that the provisions o f Article XX(g) apply only to .. .the conservation o f 
exhaustible natural resources located within the territory of the contracting party 
invoking the provision.” They did rule, however, that this extraterritoriality could 
only be applied with respect to the countries’ own nationals and vessels.
Nonetheless, this is a landmark decision opening the door for the first time to the 
validation of extraterritorial measures aimed at protecting a natural resource.
Second, the panel examined the issue of whether the embargo was applied “in 
conjunction” with domestic restrictions and policies and if those policies were 
primarily aimed^ at the conservation of dolphins. In its analysis, the panel noted 
that the intermediary embargo restricted the importation of tuna products from 
affected nations, regardless o f whether the tuna was harvested in a manner harmful to 
dolphins. Therefore, the policy was not “primarily aimed” at the conservation of 
dolphins. The panel also ruled that because the primary embargo was not held against 
nations harvesting tuna in accordance with U.S. standards, even if their method was 
harmful to dolphins, the measure was not applied equally to all nations,’ and 
therefore violated the GATT. Furthermore, the panel ruled that because the U.S. 
embargoes could not effectively conserve dolphins unless other nations changed their 
own domestic conservation policies in accordance with those of the U.S., the primary
supra  note 89
' The panel chose to adopt the interpretation o f  previous panels. They interpreted the phrase: “related to 
the conservation o f  exhaustible resources” to mean “primarily aimed at the conservation o f  exhaustible 
natural resources.”
' " i t  would be interesting to note i f  the panel took into account that there may be other methods, that are 
not in accordance with U .S. standards, o f  harvesting tuna without harming dolphins, i.e. as in the 
Shrimp/Turtle case described in Section IV(A)(2).
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and intermediary nation embargoes were not permissible under the GATT. Lastly, 
the panel ruled that based on the above analysis, the U.S. embargoes were also in 
violation of the chapeau to Article XX. '
The analysis of Article XX(b) mirrored much of the panel’s reasoning in its 
interpretation of Article XX(g). The EEC and the Netherlands did not challenge the 
MMPA on the grounds that it was not designed for “the protection of human, animal, 
or plant life or health,” therefore the panel did not address this issue. Instead, the 
EEC and the Netherlands again argued the issue o f extraterritoriality. In accordance 
with its interpretation of Article XX(g), the panel ruled that nothing in GATT limits 
the scope of a nation’s unilateral policies as such. Second, the panel analyzed 
whether the embargoes were “necessary” to protect dolphin life and health. Again, in 
accordance with its analysis of Article XX(g), the panel ruled that it was not 
“necessary” because the policies could not accomplish their objectives without 
forcing domestic policy changes in the affected nations.
Lastly, in response to the U.S. claim that the embargo fell under the exception in 
Article XX(d),"^ the panel ruled that because the primary nation embargo was 
inconsistent with GATT Article XI(1), it could not be justified under this exception.
2. Shrimp / Turtle Cases
The chapeau to Article XX states the following:
Subject to the requirements that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
m eans o f  arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the sam e conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, notliing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent the adoption or enforcem ent by any contracting party o f  m easu res.. .  
s,upra note 106
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i) Historical Overview
A similar dispute was brought before the WTO dispute resolution panel in 
1997 by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand."'^ This dispute involved unilateral 
trade sanctions imposed by the U.S. upon countries whose shrimp harvesting methods 
result in the killing o f high numbers o f incidental sea turtles. One such method is the 
use of driftnets, or “curtains o f death.”*'  ̂Driftnets,"^ are huge fishing nets up to 
thirty miles long and forty feet wide' which are left to move freely with ocean 
currents and ensnare whatever comes into their path. The United Nations has called 
for a moratorium on the use of driftnets."® A second method, the use of shrimp 
trawlers, also causes high levels of incidental sea turtle takings. National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) studies have shown that up to 48,000 sea turtles are killed 
annually by U.S. fishing fleets off o f the Gulf o f Mexico and the South A tlantic,"’ 
other studies show that close to 125,000 turtles die each year worldwide as a result o f 
shrimp trawling and tuna harvesting activities. In response to these studies, the 
NMFS developed the Turtle Excluder Device (TED), which significantly decreased 
the numbers of sea turtles taken during shrimp harvesting operations.'^' In 1989
Other WTO members also challenged the import ban with oral arguments. Including: Australia,
Ecuador, El Salvador, the European Union, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Japan, Nigeria, Philippines, Singapore, 
and Venezuela. See Susan Sakmar, Free Trade and Sea Turtles: The International and Dom estic  
Implications o f  the Shrimp-Turtle Cases, 10 Colorado Journal o f  International Environmental Policy and 
Law 347 at 357
Paul Stanton Kibel, Justice for the Sea Turtle: M arine Conser\>ation and the Court o f  International 
Trade, 15 UCLA Environmental Law and Policy 57 at 60
Driftnets are outlawed for use by U.S. fishing fleets see High Seas Driftnet Moratorium Protection Act, 
16 u  s  e  § 1826 (1999) 
supra  note 64 at 649
see Large-scale P elagic Driftnet Fishing and its Im pact on the Living M arine resources o f  the W orld's 
Oceans and Seas, G.A. Res. 215, U.N. GAOR, 46''' Sess. 79'*’ plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A /Res/46/215 (1991) 
supra  note 64 at 649  
supra  note 115 at 59
TED ’s can free up to 97% o f  incidentally taken sea turtles and can be installed for approximately U.S. 
$50-600 per boat. See supra  note 64 at 649.
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Congress passed Section 609 of Public Law 101-162, an appropriations act that 
amended the Endangered Species A ct.'^  Section 609 prohibits the importation of 
shrimp jfrom countries whose shrimp harvesting methods fail to meet U.S. standards 
through the use o f TEDs or other comparable protection measures.
ii) WTO Panel Decision
In arguing this case, the complainants contended that they already had domestic 
conservation plans in place aimed at the conservation of sea turtles, and that use o f a TED 
was not the only shrimp harvest method effective in avoiding the incidental takings of sea 
turtles. In response, the U.S. argued that because the use o f trawling nets caused the 
highest number of incidental mortality of sea turtles, use o f a TED on trawling vessels 
was necessary for the conservation o f the s p e c i e s . T h e  U.S. argued that the 
conservation measures taken by the complainants to protect sea turtles were ineffective.
In turn, the complainants argued that the use of TEDs was cost prohibitive and/or not 
entirely effective for use on shrimp trawlers. Additionally, two non-govemmental 
organizations (NGOs) had submitted documentation concerning sea turtle ecology to the 
panel for review under Article 13 o f the Dispute Settlement Understanding. The panel 
ruled that because the documents were unsolicited they were not permitted to take them 
into account. However, the panel did invite either party to include the documents as part
16 U.S.C. ÿ 1533(d) (1994)
123 see Report o f  the Panel on United States -  Im port Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
M ay 15, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 832 [hereinafter
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement o f  Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 
112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU] Additionally, the Dispute Settlement Body (D SB) is established by the DSU  
to assist in dispute resolution between parties.
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o f its own submissions. Specific to GATT requirements, the plaintiffs argued that the 
U.S. had violated GATT Article Xl'^^ and that the embargo was not justified under 
GATT Article XX exemptions.
The U.S. did not dispute that the embargo violated GATT Article XI(1), instead 
they argued that since the embargo was justified by Articles XX(b), (g) and (d), the 
violation was irrelevant. Accordingly, the panel concurred that the embargo was in 
violation of GATT Article XI(1).
The complainants argued that Article XX did not justify the embargo because the 
U.S. could not invoke a measure to protect turtles outside of its jurisdiction. In 
evaluating the applicability o f Article XX, the panel focused on the Article chapeau.
The panel chose to interpret the term “unjustifiable” in the context o f the overall object 
and purpose of the GATT : to promote economic development through free trade. The 
panel stated that a member is only justified in using Article XX exemptions to deviate 
from the requirements o f GATT when done in a way not to undermine the objective of 
the agreement. Based on this interpretation, the panel ruled that Section 609 did not fall 
within the scope of Article XX and therefore, the U.S. was “unjustified” in using Article 
XX exemptions to qualify the embargo.'"^
Hi) WTO Appellate Body Decision
supra  note 30 
supra  note 112
127
The panel also noted that in efforts associated with environmental protection, M EAs are a preferred 
method to unilateral sanctions. See supra  note 123 para 7.50
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Under political pressure from environmental groups and other politicians, 
President Bill Clinton appealed the WTO panel decision. The dispute was brought to a 
WTO Appellate Body in 1998. The U.S. appealed the panel decision on two grounds:
(1) The panel erred in finding that it could not review unsolicited infoimation from 
NGOs; and (2) The panel erred in finding that Section 609 did not fall within the scope of 
Article XX.
The Appellate Body found that the panel had indeed erred in its interpretation of 
Article 13 of the DSU. The Appellate Body ruled that the panel had the “discretionary 
authority either to accept and consider or to reject information and advice submitted to it, 
whether requested by the panel or not.” '̂ *
Regarding the second issue, the Appellate Body ruled that the panel had erred in 
its interpretation of the chapeau. It ruled that the panel “did not inquire specifically into 
how the application o f Section 609 constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.” '^  ̂Additionally, the Appellate Body rejected the 
panel’s chapeau down approach. The Appellate Body stated that the appropriate way to 
interpret Article XX, was primarily by justifying or rejecting its applicability under 
Sections (b), (g) or (d), followed by justification or rejection under the conditions in the 
chapeau.
see Report o f  the Appellate Body United States -  Import Prohibition o f  Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, October 12, 1998.
129 see ibid. at para. 114.
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In its analysis o f Article XX(g), the Appellate Body addressed the issue o f 
whether Section 609 applied to an “exhaustible natural resource.” In accordance with past 
panel decisions, it ruled that sea turtles are indeed an exhaustible natural resource. Next, 
it examined whether Section 609 is “related to the conservation” o f sea turtles. The 
Appellate Body found that based on the amount o f scientific evidence provided to the 
panel regarding the mortality rate associated with shrimp trawling and the effectiveness 
o f TEDs, the measure was indeed “related to conservation” o f sea turtles. Lastly, the 
Appellate Body examined whether Section 609 was a “measure made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic” harvesting of shrimp. The Appellate Body 
found that indeed it was, as the U.S. had corresponding regulations affecting domestic 
fishing vessels.
Having justified Article XX(g)’s applicability to Section 209, the Appellate Body 
turned to the chapeau of Article XX. It examined the issues o f “unjustifiable 
discrimination,” and “arbitrary discrimination” as they relate to Section 609 
requirements. First, in examining the issue o f “unjustifiable discrimination,” the 
Appellate Body ruled that the U.S. was indeed in violation. It found four reasons: (I) the 
U.S. embargo was aimed at forcing other member nations to adopt policy changes; (2) the 
embargo did not permit imports of shrimp from vessels using TEDs if those shrimp 
originated in waters under the jurisdiction of nations not certified under Section 609;'^^ 
(3) the U.S. failed to engage in multilateral negotiations to solve the problem before
Similar to the requirements under MMPA, Section 609 required that nations’ shrimp harvesting methods 
be certified by the U.S.
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implementing the embargo; and (4) the U.S. gave differential treatment to different 
affected member nations through the application o f phase-in periods and transfer o f TED 
technology. Next, the Appellate Body looked at the issue o f “arbitrary discrimination.” It 
found that the “rigidity and inflexibility” o f the certification process under Section 609 
constituted “arbitrary discrimination.” It referenced the fact that in order for a nation to 
receive certification, Section 609 essentially requires it to adopt shrimp harvesting 
policies identical to those of the U.S. The Appellate Body also found that the lack of 
“transparency” involved in the certification process not only amounted to “arbitrary 
discrimination,” but was also violated the GATT Article 111(3).* '̂ The Appellate Body 
noted the lack of opportunity for a nation to respond or argue against a negative 
certification decision.
Based on the above analysis, the Appellate Body ruled that despite the 
applicability of Article XX(g) to Section 609, this appropriations act failed to meet the 
requirements of the chapeau of GATT Article XX. They recommended that the U.S. 
bring its policies into compliance with its obligations under the GATT. Despite the final 
Appellate Body decision, this ruling is significant in that it opens the door for member 
nations to impose unilateral sanctions on other member nations provided that certain 
requirements are met.
GATT Article 111(3) provides that:
Each member shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all it’s laws, 
regulations, decisions, and rulings...Each member shall maintain, or institute as soon as 
practicable, judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, 
o f  the prompt review and correction o f  administrative action relating to customs matters.
GATT Article XXIV defines transparency guidelines for member nations.
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3. U.S. Gasoline Standards Case
i) Historical Overview
The Clean Air Act Amendments o f 1990 established programs for reformulated 
and conventional gasoline. The programs required changes in the composition o f gasoline 
sold to consumers. A baseline year o f 1990 was established by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), which affected domestic and foreign companies in different 
ways. Domestic companies were permitted to establish individual baselines based on 
their own 1990 data. Foreign companies, however, were not given similar liberty, and 
were required to use a statutory baseline set by the EPA. The WTO dispute resolution 
panel concluded that this restriction was (1) not consistent with Article 111:4 o f the GATT 
which outlines the National Treatment P r i n c i p l e ; a n d  (2) could not be justified by any 
Article XX exceptions. The case was subsequently taken to an Appellate Body which 
reached the same final conclusion, although through vastly different reasoning, as 
discussed infra.
ii) Appellate Body Decision
Although the WTO panel decided that the conditions of the sanction placed on 
foreign gasoline did not satisfy the requirements of the GATT Article XX(g), the 
Appellate Body decided that those requirements were indeed satisfied. However, the
Report o f  the Appellate Body in the United States -  Standards for the Reformulation and Conventional 
Gasoline, M ay 20, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 603
133 Discussed in 11(B)(1) above
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Appellate Body also decided that the measure constituted “unjustifiable discrimination,” 
and a “disguised restriction on international trade.” The Appellate Body added that:
[T]he kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a 
particular measure amounts to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination,” may 
also be taken into account in determining the presence of a “disguised restriction” 
on international trade. The fundamental theme is to be found in the purpose and 
object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules 
available in Article XX.
The Appellate Body stated that the U.S. could have avoiding violating GATT Article 
111:4 by allowing equal treatment to foreign and domestic companies. This could have 
been done in one of two ways; (1) allowing foreign companies to establish their own 
baselines; or (2) imposing a statutory baseline on domestic companies. The Appellate 
Body further stated:
These two omissions go well beyond what was necessary for the Panel to 
determine that a violation of Article 111:4 had occurred in the first place. The 
resulting discrimination must have been foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent 
or unavoidable.'^^
The Appellate Body was justified in its analysis of the U.S.’s use of “unjustifiable 
discrimination” between nations with respect to establishing baselines and therefore its 
violation of GATT Article III. This decision highlights the necessity of vigilant analysis
United States -  Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report 35 
I.L .M . 603 (1996)
'^ \W a t 6 2 8
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of GATT provisions to avoid clear violations as was evident in the U.S. Gasoline 
Standards Case.
4. Asbestos Case*̂ ®
i) Historical Overview
In the Asbestos Case, the Canadian government challenged a French ban on 
imports o f asbestos or asbestos-containing products. The decision in the landmark case 
represents the first time that a WTO panel found that a trade measure in conflict with the 
substantive obligations of the GATT justified under GATT Article XX. The case 
subsequently went to an appellate body, which, while upholding the Panel’s overall 
conclusion, chose not to rely on Article XX but instead focused on GATT Articles 
111:4’^̂  and X I . The Appellate Body ruled that the trade measure in question did not 
represent a violation of Article III and was therefore permissible under GATT.
ii) Panel Decision
The Canadian government contended that the French ban violated GATT Article 
III because the asbestos products it exported to France were “like products” to substitute 
products manufactured in France. France claimed that the ban fell within the exemptions 
allowed for in GATT Article XX. In order to determine whether Canadian asbestos was 
indeed a “like product” to the French alternative product, the Panel employed a three 
prong analysis. It analyzed; 1) the end uses o f the products; 2) consumers’ tastes and
'-’6 WTO Panel Report on European Communities -  Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, W T/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Panel Report]
outlining the National Treatment Principle 
prohibiting any quantitative restrictions on imports
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habits; and 3) the products’ properties, nature, and q u a l i t y . T h e  Panel ruled that the 
Canadian and French products were “like products’’ because they had similar end uses 
and were therefore subject to the scrutiny, and in violation o f the GATT Article III. 
Therefore, the Panel found that the French ban was in violation of the GATT Article III. 
However, the panel found the ban justified under GATT Article XX(b) as well as the 
GATT Article XX chapeau.
The panel ruled that the ban fell within the scope of GATT Article XX(b) because 
asbestos presented a significant risk to human health. It reached this decision despite 
Canada’s claims that because the asbestos was encapsulated in cement products it did not 
present a human health risk due to exposure. The panel went on to rule that the ban 
was indeed “necessary,” because there does not exist an alternative method to protect 
human health which is “less inconsistent” with the requirements o f the GATT.’*̂  ̂Next, 
the panel turned to the Article XX chapeau and examined the issue of “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination.” It ruled that because France imposed the ban against all 
asbestos products regardless of their country of origin, the ban did not constitute 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.” Lastly, the panel examined whether or not the 
ban constituted a “disguised restriction on international trade.” It defined “disguised” to 
mean “conceal[ed] beneath deceptive appearances, counterfeit, alter so as to deceive.
Laura Yavitz, The World Trade Organization A ppellate B ody Report, European Communities -  
M easures Ajfecting A sbestos and  Asbestos-Containing Products. M arch 12, 2001, WT/DS135/AB/R, 11 
Minn. J. Global Trade 43
Expert testimony was taken into account to com e to this decision.
The panel examined and rejected the method o f  “controlled use” o f  asbestos in order to make this 
determination. See supra  note 139 at 54. 
supra  note 139 at 56
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The Panel concluded that because the sanction was published and the WTO was notified 
o f the measure was not “disguised.”
in) Appellate Body Decision
This landmark decision, allowing an exception under Article XX, was 
subsequently appealed to a WTO/GATT Appellate Body.*'*  ̂The Appellate Body also 
reached a landmark decision that was not simply an upholding of the original Panel’s 
ruling. The Appellate Body found the French measure consistent with French obligations 
under the GATT. It concluded that the ban did not violate GATT Article Ill’s National 
Treatment principle, and therefore the Article XX exceptions did not apply. It’s method 
o f analysis is described below.
In reaching their decision, the Appellate Body focused on the definition of “like 
products.” It stated that the Panel had not analyzed the term “like products” thoroughly 
because the Panel had not taken into account the “risk” '"*'̂  factor in its analysis. The 
Appellate Body also noted that products competitive with one another are considered 
“like products.” In its analysis, the Appellate Body used the same framework criteria 
as the Panel. Namely, it used a market-based approach examining; 1 ) physical properties;
2) end uses; and 3)tariff classification. Additionally, the Appellate Body noted that these
It is interesting to note that in making it's decision the Appellate Body chose to prohibit the submission 
o f  any documentation from NGOs. This is in stark contrast to the decision made by the Shrimp/Turtle 
Appellate Body. 
supra  note 139 
supra  note 139 at 59
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criteria simply served as a framework for analysis and other aspects could be included. 
The Appellate Body compared the “physical properties” of the Canadian asbestos to the 
French alternative product. It noted that the “physical properties” must be analyzed in 
light o f the effect that differences in such properties may have on the marketability o f the 
p r o d u c t s . I t  went on to write that the health risk should be included in the analysis o f 
“physical properties,” as well as with respect to “consumer taste,” because the health risk 
may have significant impact on these two issues. Based on these facts the Appellate Body 
found that the Canadian asbestos and the French substitutes were not “like products” 
because the Canadian products had an associated health risk while the French substitute 
did not. The Appellate Body went on to clarify its decision by stating that for “likeness” 
to be determined, a member nation must provide two things: 1 ) evidence of unlikeness 
based on different end uses; and 2) a showing that the number of similar applications 
outweighs the number of dissimilar app l i c a t i ons .Based  on its findings described 
above, the Appellate Body declined to review criteria based on “consumer taste and 
habits,” or “tariff classification.” ''*̂
B. Under What Conditions Would a Canadian Imposed Trade Sanction on U.S. 
Derived AAUs Be Permissible Under WTO/GATT and NAFTA?
supra  note 139 at 59
WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities -  Measures Restricting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, W T/DS135/AB/R at ww w .w to.org [hereinafter Appellate Body Report] at 
para 114
supra  note 139 at 61
Canada also challenged the French ban under other sections o f  the GATT including Article 2 o f  the TBT  
Agreement, GATT Article XXIII: 1(b), and GATT Article XL Because these arguments are not relevant to 
GATT Article X X  exemptions, they will be not be discussed in this paper.
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A close analysis o f the decisions made in the cases described above, as well as some 
additional inquiry, must be employed before attempting to answer this question. 
Furthermore, the lack of formal binding precedent set by WTO panels on fiiture WTO 
panel decisions, and on future NAFTA panel decisions, eliminate the guarantee with any 
degree o f certainty that the conclusion reached by one Panel would be followed by 
another. However, an examination of the facts at hand can provide insight into what 
would likely transpire i f  past interpretations of the law made by WTO panels are taken 
into account by future NAFTA panels. As noted above in Section 11(C)(3), NAFTA 
Chapter 21 defers explicitly to GATT Article XX. Therefore, references to, and the 
language of, GATT Article XX will be used in the following discussion. The reader is 
advised that GATT Article XX is effectively the same as NAFTA Chapter 21 for the 
purposed of this analysis.
1. Would a Canadian Unilateral Sanction Fall Under the Scope of Article XX?
The very nature of a unilateral sanction, or ban, conflicts with member obligations 
under WTO/GATT and NAFTA, as it places a quantitative restriction on products 
imported from other member nations, and thereby also favors like products created 
domestically. Therefore, a Canadian unilateral sanction imposed against U.S. created 
AAUs would likely violate the NAFTA and the GATT’s most favored nation (MFN), 
and/or national treatment principles, as well as their prohibitions on quantitative 
restrictions placed on imports from other member coun t r i es .However ,  GATT Article
supra  notes 27, 29, and 30
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allows for exceptions to these requirements under specific conditions. Therefore, 
if  the Canadian sanction can be justified under GATT Article XX it may, nonetheless, be 
permissible under GATT and NAFTA. It is important to note however, that to qualify for 
Article XX exemptions ERUs must be deemed “products” under GATT and NAFTA. 
This assumption has been made below.
Based on the cases discussed above, there are a number o f requirements that must be 
met in order for a unilateral Canadian sanction against U.S. created AAUs to fall under 
the scope of Article XX. Each of these questions is examined below.
i) Article XX(b)
Article XX(b) requires us to ask the question; is such a measure related to the 
conservation of human, animal, or plant life or health? This is a difficult question to 
answer in that the sanction itself only protects Canada firom economic loss as a result of 
not being able to account for U.S. created AAUs under the rules o f the Kyoto Protocol. 
Certainly the sanction does indirectly protect human health in that it removes one 
potential barrier preventing Canada from participating in the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto 
Protocol in itself certainly pertains to, and is arguably necessary, to the conservation of 
human, animal and plant life and health for a number of reasons. Among the threats to 
human health, scientific literature cites a number of problems in response to increased 
global temperature including increased death rate among the “very young, very old, and 
sick” populations, introduction of and increase o f tropical diseases such as malaria.
151 and corresponding N A FTA  Chapter 21
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cholera, Lyme disease, and encephalitis, increases in air and water borne parasites, and 
loss o f habitation due to increased sea level as polar ice caps melt.'^^ Animal life and 
health is also threatened by the effects o f global warming. One, o f many examples 
includes Thai tropical fish populations. Tropical fish are extremely sensitive to small 
increases in water temperature. Experts anticipate that even a one to two degree 
temperature increase in sea water will increase fish susceptibility to various diseases. 
Lastly, scientific literature also suggests that plant life and health will suffer as a result o f 
global warming. According to one peer reviewed journal article:
Indirect effects of elevated CO2 on trees and forests are likely to be as, or more 
important than their direct effects on photosynthesis. For example, elevated CO] 
can decrease N[itrogen] concentrations and increase nonstructural carbohydrates 
and secondary metabolites, all of which can alter tree resistance to pests and 
herbivores...
It is unclear how a NAFTA panel may interpret an indirect link between the 
sanction and the requirements of Article XX(b). However, based on the historical trend 
of WTO/GATT dispute resolution panels to favor fi*ee trade over environmental and 
human health issues whenever possible, it is unlikely that a NAFTA panel will be able to 
jump the gap and find a connection between the sanction and requirements o f Article
see Fiona Godlee, Health Im plications o f  Climate Change, British Medical Journal, v303 n l2  p 254  
(N ov, 1991) and McM ichael, Anthony and Haines, Andrew, G lobal Climate Change: the po ten tia l effects 
on health. British Medical Journal, v315 n71 11 p805 (Sept, 1997) For additional information about the 
effects on human populations due to global warming see Norman M yers, Environmental Refugees in a 
G lobally W arned World, B ioScience v43 n l 1 p752 (1993)
Jordan Gold, Thai Fish Industry in H ot Water, Alternatives Journal, v28 i2 p3 (Spring, 2002)
John Aber et. al. F orest Processes and G lobal Environm ental Change: P redicting the Effects o f  
Individual and M ultiple Stressors, B ioScience v51 i9 p735 ( Sept 2001)
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XX(b). Nevertheless, for the sake of argument suppose a NAFTA panel does indeed find 
that the sanction is related to the protection of human health. In this case, the necessity of 
the sanction must be analyzed in conjunction with the policy the sanction is designed to 
protect.
Therefore, the next question is: whether the sanction and/or the Kyoto Protocol 
are “necessary” for the protection of human health. Depending on how one interprets the 
meaning of “necessary,” as discussed in the above cases, the U.S. could use two broad 
arguments to assert that a sanction is not necessary: (1) There is a lack of scientific 
evidence on global climate change to justify that a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
are necessary to protect human health, and (2) The sanction and/or the Kyoto Protocol are 
not necessary due to the availability o f other options that are “less inconsistent” with 
member obligations under N A F T A . F i r s t ,  one must look at the interpretation of 
“necessity” as it relates to the protection of human health. The United States participation 
in the UNFCCC serves as an acknowledgement o f the global warming problem. 
Furthermore, U.S. participation in the Montreal P r o t o c o l i s  evidence to the fact that the 
methods undertaken by the Kyoto Protocol to slow down the effects o f global warming 
and ozone layer depletion have been accepted by the U.S. in the past. Additionally, 
participation in negotiations leading up to the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol, as well as 
George W. Bush’s proposal o f an alternative to the Kyoto Protocol relying on similar, but
As noted in WTO document SAVPPS/W/9, The Relevance o f  the D isciplines o f  the Agreements on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and on Import Licensing Procedures to Article VI;4 o f  the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (11 September, 1996, p. 5), “A measure that has the effect o f  restricting 
trade can be considered “necessary” only i f  there is no alternative measure less disruptive o f  trade which a 
Member may reasonably be expected to employ to achieve the same policy objective”.” -W T O  web site 
found 5/26/02
' ̂  The Montreal Protocol controls the release o f  certain other greenhouse gases not addressed in the Kyoto 
Protocol for the purposes o f  slow ing down depletion o f  the ozone layer
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voluntary, measures also serves as a U.S. acknowledgement of the necessity for the 
emission reductions called for by the Kyoto Protocol. Lastly, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency recently released a report acknowledging that climate change is a 
problem that we should be concerned about. The economic implications relating to the 
case where Canada is forced to accept U.S. created AAUs is outside the scope of this 
paper. Therefore, this paper assumes that the sanction is necessary from an economic 
standpoint for Canadian participation in the Kyoto Protocol.
Regarding the second potential interpretation of the term “necessary,” claiming 
that there are other options that would not require the use of a sanction forcing Canada to 
deviate from its obligations under NAFTA, there are a number o f issues to consider.
First, and foremost, it is absolutely imperative that before employing a unilateral 
sanction, Canada engage in extensive discussions with the U.S. in attempts to solve the 
problem multilaterally. As seen in the Tuna/Dolphin cases, as well as in the 
Shrimp/Turtle case, the panels strongly emphasized the importance of attempting to 
resolve conflicts between international trade agreements and MEAs through the 
multilateral agreement rather than resorting to unilateral action. The NAFTA itself, in 
Chapter 21 Section 104, permits for amendment to the agreement in order to list 
additional MEAs, such as the Kyoto Protocol, as exempt from the obligations of the 
agreement. If this outlet were not properly exhausted before the implementation of a 
unilateral sanction, the results would likely be catastrophic to Canada’s case.
See “The Third National Communication on Climate Change U.S. Climate Action Report" (2002) 
Available at www.epa.gov
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For the purpose of discussion, assuming the U.S. refuses to amend Section 104 to 
include the Kyoto Protocol, the burden still remains on Canada to demonstrate that it has 
exhausted all other options to resolve the problem of global climate change without 
causing them to deviate from their obligations under NAFTA. If such a demonstration is 
made, the Kyoto Protocol, and thus the sanction protecting it, may qualify as “necessary” 
under this second interpretation of the term. Evidence that all options have been 
exhausted will be found in the extent to which the international community, including the 
U.S., has been involved in negotiations surrounding the problem of climate change since 
the inception of the UNFCCC. The mere existence o f the UNFCCC, and the series of 
negotiations and discussions that have been undertaken, is further evidence to the fact 
that other options have been explored and rejected, justifying the necessity o f the Kyoto 
Protocol in combating the problem. Lastly, George W. Bush’s widely criticized 
alternative to the Kyoto Protocol and its rejection by the international community as a 
viable alternative, could be evidence to the fact that all other options have been explored 
and rejected. Therefore, Canada should be able to argue successfully that a unilateral 
sanction on U.S., and all other non-party nation, derived ERUs falls within the scope of 
Article XX(b) and/or the NAFTA equivalent.
ii) Article XX(g)
Article XX(g) requires asking the question o f whether a measure relates to the 
conservation of an exhaustible resource. Answering this we are left with the same 
predicament. Although the Kyoto Protocol is related to the protection of many
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exhaustible natural resources (i.e., island nations, coastal habitats, polar ice caps, fishing 
industry resources, etc.), the sanction itself is a form of economic protection, and not in 
itself directly related to the protection of these resources.
For the sake of argument, assume that a NAFTA panel accepts the fact that, 
although not directly linked, because the sanction is a necessary precursor to Canadian 
participation in the Kyoto Protocol, it is in fact “related to” the conservation of 
exhaustible resources. This raises the question of whether the measure being invoked is 
made in conjunction with domestic measures or restrictions. The answer to this question 
will ultimately lie in the wording of the sanction itself. The sanction must be tfamed so 
as to affect participation in the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions trading system at an 
individual, corporate, national, and international level equally. If it fails to do so, the 
sanction would not have a direct effect on domestic Canadian industry, and may therefore 
be found to violate National Treatment principle. In the absence of an explicit reference, 
it may be argued that the sanction is not being invoked in conjunction with domestic 
measures. Simple testimony to Canada’s participation in the Protocol may not be enough. 
Canadian policy must explicitly affect any emitter, Canadian or not, who is not in 
compliance with, or working towards meeting Kyoto Protocol commitments.
Hi) Article X X  Chapeau
Assuming that the sanction and the associated Kyoto Protocol are justified under 
either Article XX(b) or (g), the panel would then turn to analysis of the chapeau of
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Article XX. The chapeau first requires examination of whether the measures represent 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against international trade. Assuming the 
sanction affects all nations equally, i.e., any individual, corporation, or nation not in 
compliance with Kyoto Protocol commitments, the sanction is not arbitrary 
discrimination but equally imposed, calculated discrimination. Under these 
circumstances, the Canadian government has carefully chosen who will be affected by 
the ban and has presumably given good reason for the ban, i.e. the ban excludes those 
who chose not to participate in the protection of the human, animal and plant life and 
health through membership under the Kyoto Protocol.
The question o f whether the sanction is “justifiable discrimination” is a bit more 
complicated. Clearly, Canada is justified in its concern that if  forced to accept U.S. 
created AAUs, it will not be able to account for them in order to meet Canadian 
requirements under the Kyoto Protocol.’ *̂ However, the Tuna/Dolphin I and II panels 
ruled against the U.S. because they interpreted their unilateral trade sanction to be 
unjustifiable in that they were forcing domestic policy changes on other member nations 
in order for those nations to gain access to U.S. markets. This appears to be the critical 
issue. It is quite likely that a unilateral Canadian sanction on non-Kyoto Protocol 
member created AAUs will be viewed as a sanction designed to force policy changes, 
i.e., the adoption o f the Kyoto Protocol, by NAFTA or WTO member nations who are not 
party to the Protocol at the time of implementation of the sanction. The Tuna/Dolphin II
158 supra  note 1
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panel explicitly stated that unilateral measu re sa t t empt ing to influence policy changes 
in other member nations is simply not acceptable under GATT.'^^ On the other hand, 
other GATT panels, such as the Appellate Body reviewing the Shrimp/Turtle case, 
recognized that unilateral sanctions are inherently designed to influence policy changes in 
nonconforming nations, and that in some cases, and under certain conditions this may be 
justified. They approach recognition o f the fact that a unilateral sanction is initially 
imposed to account for differences in domestic policy, and by establishing this as an 
unconditionally unjustifiable conflict with GATT or NAFTA, the Article XX exemptions 
are essentially self defeating. Specifically, the Appellate Body states:
Conditioning access to a Member’s domestic market'^' on whether exporting 
Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by 
the importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures 
falling within the scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article 
XX. Paragraphs (a) to (j) comprise measures that are recognized as exceptions to 
substantive obligations established in the GATT 1994, because the domestic 
policies embodied in such measures have been recognized as important and 
legitimate in character.
The Appellate Body added:
i.e. the unilateral sanction protecting Canadian econom ic interests under the Kyoto Protocol, NOT the 
Protocol itself. 
supra  note 50
In this case, I am referring to Canada's implementation o f  a unilateral sanction, mirroring it’s 
obligations under the multilateral Kyoto Protocol, which would restrict U.S. access to Canadian AAU  
markets. An alternative argument can be made by Canada that it is actually the Kyoto Protocol that calls 
for these restrictions on trade, and because the Kyoto Protocol is a multilateral agreement which the U.S. 
opted not to take part in, a Canadian unilateral sanction designed to protect Canadian interests under the 
Kyoto Protocol should not be subject to the intense scrutiny generally imposed by WTO/GATT panels on 
unilateral sanctions. However, the Geneva Convention on Treaties clearly states that in the case o f  conflict 
between two international/multilateral treaties, that which is later in date and signed by all parties involved. 
shall take precedence. Canada has essentially given up it's right to partake in any international agreements 
that conflict with NAFTA and/or GATT unless all parties involved in these previous agreements consent. 
Therefore, it would seem  that the only way for Canada to restrict access to A A U  markets under the Kyoto 
Protocol is to prove that trade in ERUs falls within an exception to GATT and/or NAFTA or that they are 
not subject to NAFTA and/or GATT restrictions in the first place. This paper will examine both o f  these 
alternatives.
supra  note 123
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We have not decided that the sovereign nations that are Members of the WTO 
cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, such as sea 
turtles. Clearly, they can and should.
Unfortunately, the Appellate Body does not clarify specifically how a member nation can 
do this without being in violation of WTO or NAFTA restrictions. Therefore, it is 
necessary to look at specifics of their interpretations for direction. Although this is a step 
in the right direction, because WTO panel decisions are not binding on future WTO or 
NAFTA panels, one is left with uncertainty as to how any particular panel will interpret 
the law at hand. However, the above analysis provides some direction as to how AAUs, 
and policy actions designed to protect a market in AAUs, may circumvent NAFTA 
and/or WTO restrictions.
V. Emission Reduction Credits: Classified as “Services”
Another, arguably more likely, possibility is that the WTO and/or the 
NAFTA will classify AAUs as “services.” If AAUs are indeed classified as 
“services” they will be subject to the rules contained in the GATS. The GATS 
contains many of the same stipulations as the GATT including clauses mirroring 
the Most Favored Nation P r i n c i p l e , a n d  the National Treatment Principle.
GATS Article II states:
w ith  respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately 
and unconditionally to services and service suppliers o f  any other Member treatment no less 
favorable than it accords to like services and service suppliers o f  any other country.
GATS Article XVII states:
In sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, 
each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers o f  any other Member, in respect o f  all
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Additionally, the GATS contains a clause dictating that domestic market access 
be accorded equally to all member na t i ons /There fore ,  member obligations to 
these principles may conflict with obligations under the Kyoto Protocol emissions 
trading system in the same way as discussed in Section IV, a b o v e . I n  the event 
that AAUs are classified as “services,” and a Canadian unilateral sanction is 
challenged by a WTO or NAFTA member n a t i o n , a  WTO or NAFTA tribunal 
would hear the case. Irrespective o f ERU classification (i.e., goods or services), 
the same rules would apply (i.e., MFN and national treatment). Therefore, it is 
likely that a similar line of reasoning would be employed as discussed in Section 
IV(B) cases above. The following section will examine the key differences 
between the GATT and the GATS as they relate to trade in AAUs. Furthermore, 
this section will discuss how these differences may affect trade in AAUs under 
the Kyoto Protocol.
A. GATS Exceptions
1. General Exceptions
measures affecting the supply o f  services, treatment no less favorable than it accords its own like 
services and service suppliers.
GATS Article XVI (l)states that:
With respect to market access through the m odes o f  supply identified in Article I, each Member 
shall accord services and service suppliers o f  any other Member treatment no less favorable than 
that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.
Section IV discusses the potential for ERUs to be classified as 'goods’ and the associated WTO./NAFTA 
conflicts.
That is a non-Party to the Kyoto Protocol
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GATS Article XIV contains a similar, albeit more narrow, environmental 
exception to the GATT. GATS Article XIV states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
like conditions [Emphasis added] prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of 
any measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health;
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
Although this clause is almost identical to that found in the GATT Article XX, 
looking carefully at the language reveals one key difference. The GATT requires 
that for this exemption to be used, “same conditions,” i.e. identical conditions, 
must exist in the two countries involved. The GATS solely requires that “like 
conditions,” i.e similar conditions, exist in the two countries i n v o l v e d . T h i s  
shift in language clearly broadens the coverage of the GATS agreement in 
comparison to the GATT. Such language will make it more difficult to exempt 
trade in AAUs between U.S. and Canada based on differences in the “conditions” 
in the two countries. Moreover, it is difficult to predict how a WTO dispute 
resolution panel would interpret this exemption with respect to the emissions 
trading system established by the Kyoto Protocol, because to date this provision 
has yet to be interpreted by such a panel.
GATS Article XIV (b) and (c)
The potential implications o f  this shift in language w ill be discussed further in Section VI
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2. Exempted Services
The GATS differs most significantly from the GATT in that, like the 
GATT, it is not entirely inclusive o f all services. Whereas the GATT strictly 
controls all trade related to goods among members, the GATS does offer some 
options for exclusion with respect to trade in services. Member nations have two 
options to restrict application of the GATS to specific service sectors. The first of 
which lies within the text of GATS Article X X . Article XX requires each Party 
to designate whieh specific service sectors are subject to GATS compliance. All 
service sectors accept those named therein must fully comply with the GATS 
market access and national treatment requirements. These choices are 
documented in each Member’s GATS Schedule of Commitments. Therefore, 
parties may impose quantitative restrictions and restrict market access to trade in 
specific services with respeet to market access and national treatment obligations.
Second, each party has the opportunity to exempt from GATS restrictions 
specific measures which would otherwise violate its obligations under the Most 
Favored Nation Principle.’ This exemption only applies to the restricted service 
for a limited period of time, generally not to exceed 10 y e a r s . T h e s e  options
GATS Article X X  specifically states:
Each M ember shall set out in a schedule the specific com m itm ents it undertakes under Part 111 o f  this 
Agreement. With respect to sectors where such com m itm ents are undertaken, each Schedule shall sp ec ify ;
(a) terms, lim itations and conditions on market access
(b) conditions and qualification on national treatment
GATS Annex on Article II Exemptions 
GATS Annex on Article II Exemptions (6)
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may provide an avenue to exempt trade in AAUs from the provisions outlined in 
the GATS agreement. Exploring this possibility requires asking: 1) If AAUs are 
classified as “services,” which sector o f services they will belong to; (2) Whether 
Canada has fully liberalized that service sector, thereby subjecting trade in AAUs 
to GATS national treatment and market access obligations; and (3) If so, whether 
there is a way to list trade in AAUs as an exempted service. Each o f these 
questions are discussed below.
i) Service Sector Classification
Jacob Werksman suggests that AAUs might be covered by the GATS 
Fifth Protocol on Financial S e r v i c e s . H e  suggests the possibility that AAUs 
maybe considered “negotiable instruments,” and therefore subject to GATS'^'^ 
trade restrictions.'^^ As defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, a “negotiable 
instrument” is:
A written instrument'’  ̂that (1 ) is signed by the maker or drawer, {2)includes an 
unconditional promise or order to pay a specified sum of money, (3) is payable 
on demand or at a definite time, and (4) is payable to order or bearer (UCC § 3- 
104(a))
A s defined in GATS, Annex on Financial Services, para 5(a)(x), “financial services” include;
trading for ow n account or for account customers, whether on an exchange, in an over-the-counter-market, or 
otherw ise...derivative products including, but not limited to, futures and options.. .transferable 
securities,. . .other negotiable instruments and financial assets.
Note Chapter 14 o f  the NAFTA outlines the Financial Services obligations, however, due to the 
potential breath o f  implication, this paper will focus primarily on the text o f  the GATS. 
supra  note 4
Where an “instrument” is defined as:
a written document that defines rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities, such as a 
contract, w ill, promissory note, or share certificate.
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If the international emissions trading system guidelines are designed in a manner 
similar to that of established U.S. systems, it is likely that AAUs will be 
documented in both electronic and paper certificate form. It is unlikely that these 
certificates will contain all three requirements listed above to be considered 
“negotiable instruments.” Although the certificate itself may indeed have the 
signature of the maker or drawer (i.e., government agencies responsible for 
creating them), it is unlikely that it will also state an unconditional promise to pay 
a specified sum o f money on its face. As is the case in U.S. domestic markets, a 
contract associated with the sale o f an AAU will likely contain this information. 
Therefore, perhaps the contract negotiated to purchase or sell a specified quantity 
o f AAUs may be considered a “negotiable instrument.” However, because the 
contract is once removed from the AAU certificate, (i.e., it merely facilitates the 
trade, and is not itself the object of the trade), it is difficult to determine whether 
the AAU certificate would be considered a “negotiable instrument.”
The GATS Annex on Financial Services also subjects trading in all “other 
financial assets” to GATS provisions. Some may argue that a certificate 
documenting ‘ownership’ is not a financial asset, but instead a permit allowing a 
particular activity. However, an AAU certificate indeed appears to be a “financial 
asset” because it can be bought and sold in an open market system. Assuming 
that international emissions trading markets work in a similar manner to U.S. 
emissions trading markets, one does not have to be an affected source to 
participate and/or profit from trading activities. In other words, there are no
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exisitng provisions preventing traders’ ’̂ or other unaffected profiteers from 
participating in the market. Therefore, because one can profit from the market 
without having any need for an actual “permit” to pollute, an AAU certificate 
should indeed be considered a “financial asset.”
Another alternative would treat AAUs as “securities,” and thus trade in 
this service would be regulated by the GATS. A “security” is defined to include:
...any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of 
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided 
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly know as a ‘security,’ or any certificate of interest 
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for receipt for, 
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe or to purchase, any of the 
foregoing.*’*
It is possible that an AAU certificate may be considered a “transferable 
share,” because (1) it is transferable from one person or government to 
another person or government; and (2) it represents the ownership of a 
portion of total allowable carbon dioxide, or carbon dioxide equivalent, 
e m i s s i o n s . I f  an AAU certificate were considered a “security” it would
“Traders” buy high and sell low , as opposed to “brokers” who negotiate trades for clients but do not 
generally take title to the credits.
Securities Act o f  1933 ÿ 2(a)(1)
B lack’s Law Dictionary defines a ‘share’ in part as : “an allotted portion owned by, controlled by or due 
to som eone”
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certainly apply to the AAU certificate itself and not the contract negotiated 
for the sale o f such a certificate as may be the case if  AAUs are classified 
as “negotiable instruments.”
If an AAU were considered a “negotiable instrument,” a “financial asset,” 
or a “security,” it still remains unclear whether that “negotiable instrument,” 
“financial asset,” or “security” is itself considered a “service,” or alternatively if 
this simply applies to the process by which they are traded. A more pertinent 
issue may thus be the effects o f allowing market access into an international 
emissions trading system to non-Kyoto Protocol member nations. As described 
above, a financial service includes “trading for own account or for account of 
customers,...negotiable instruments and financial services.” ' T h e r e f o r e ,  if 
AAUs are considered “negotiable instruments,” “financial assets,” or “securities,” 
the process by which they are traded'^' will likely be subject to GATS provisions. 
Brokerage houses that broker client AAU trades may be considered ‘service 
suppliers’ because they provide the ‘service’ of trading a financial asset, even if 
that particular financial asset is not covered by the GATS.'^'^
!80 Annex on Financial Services 5(a)(x)(F)
i.e. the ‘service’ is the trading, not the A A U s themselves.
Please refer to the text o f  the GATS Annex on Financial Services in Appendix B. Note that the Annex 
does not state that all ‘financial assets' are considered ‘services,’ and therefore subject to GATS provisions, 
but solely that trade in ‘financial assets' is considered a ‘service’ subject to GATS provisions. Furthermore, 
GATS Article 1(2) clarifies the scope and definition o f  the agreement in stating:
For the Purposes o f  this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supplv o f  a service  [Emphasis added]:
(a) from the territory o f  one M ember into the territory o f  any other Member;
(b) in the territory o f  one M ember to the service consum er o f  any other Member;
(c) by a service supplier o f  one M ember, through the presence o f  natural persons o f  a M ember in 
the territory o f  any other Member.
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If  this is the case, it is likely that Canada will be forced to allow U.S. 
brokerage houses to participate in a Canadian AAU market. In other words, 
Canada could not restrict market access to these U.S. financial service providers. 
The GATS does not restrict financial service providers with respect to client 
nationality, therefore, U.S. brokerage houses may be able to provide legal market 
access to U.S. corporations and/or investors. These U.S. organizations and/or 
individuals could potentially profit fi'om AAU trading system, regardless of the 
fact that they may not have taken on the economic burden of mandatory, legally 
binding emission reductions at home. This foreign participation could potentially 
drive up the cost of AAUs'^^ to the point o f making them inaccessible to 
Canadian companies.
ii) Implications o f  Canada’s Schedule o f  Commitments
In order to ascertain which sectors of its services are fully subject to these 
agreements we must look to Canada’s Schedule of Commitments'^'^ under the 
GATS and the NAFTA. Canada has not liberalized all sectors of trade in 
financial services under the GATS.'®^ Although, they have set a number of 
reservations and requirements for foreign financial service suppliers, none are 
likely to affect a U.S. owned brokerage house engaging in brokerage of AAUs,
For a detailed analysis o f  market and policy implications o f  U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol 
em issions trading system see Baron, Richard et. al., K yoto  Without the U.S.: M arket and Policy  
Im plicatiom -DRAFT, International Energy Agency
The section o f  this Schedule o f  Commitments that pertains to trade in financial services under the GATS 
can be found in Appendix D. The full text o f  Canada’s Schedule o f  Commitments under NAFTA can be 
found in Appendix C.
W ith the exception o f  some Provincial exceptions, which w ill not be discussed in this paper.
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particularly if  the company has an office located within Canada with Canadian 
employees.
Furthermore, under the NAFTA, Canada has fully liberalized trade, except 
with respect to cross-border trade in securities. Canada has reserved the right to 
adopt any measure relating to cross-border trade in securities services that 
derogates fi'om Article 1404(1)’^̂  or, with respect to the U.S., from Article 
1406.'^^ Therefore, only if  AAUs are classified as “securities” will it be possible 
for Canada to restrict U.S. participation in a Canadian AAU market. Otherwise, it 
is likely that the WTO and/or the NAFTA may prohibit Canada from imposing 
restrictions on either the country of origin of AAUs or on countries allowed 
market access.
Werksman suggests that although a Party may not be able to place 
quantitative restrictions on the “import” o f these services, once the service has 
been ‘imported’ GATS cannot prohibit Canada from refusing to recognize the 
validity of these s e r v i c e s . I n  other words, if  that WTO/NAFTA member is not 
also Party to the Protocol, GATS does not prohibit Canada from prohibiting use 
o f those allowances to meet Kyoto Protocol commitments. Furthermore, neither 
the GATS nor the NAFTA will require Canada to purchase any specific quantity
TslAFTA Article 1404(1) states that;
N o Party may adopt any measure restricting any type o f  cross-border trade in financial services by 
cross-border service providers o f  another Party that the Party permits on the date o f  entry into force 
o f  this Agreement, except to the extent set out in Section B o f  the Party's Schedule to Annex VII.
N AFTA Article 1406 outlines the M ost-Favcred-Nation Treatment guidelines
Jacob Werksman and Jurgen Lefevere, WTO Issues R aised by the Design o f  an E C  Em issions Trading 
System. FIELD (Scoping Paper No. 3) (1999) at 10
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of AAUs from the U.S. This means that although brokers and other private 
entities in Canada may be free to purchase allowances from any WTO or NAFTA 
member nation, the credits may nonetheless be worthless once they have entered 
the country. A well organized accounting system and registry for AAUs is 
imperative under this scenario and will likely ensure protection o f Kyoto Protocol 
member nation derived AAUs from economically unfair trading practices.
Hi) Altering the Schedule o f  Commitments Coverage 
It is possible for Canada to alter which services are covered under its 
Schedule of Commitments. If Canada were to go through the process of 
specifically excluding AAUs from its Schedule of Commitments, Canada could 
reduce the likelihood of encountering U.S. opposition to any access restriction 
with respect to the emissions trading market. GATS Article XXI stipulates the 
conditions and process by which a Member nation may modify and/or alter its 
Schedule of Commitments. The relevant text from Article XXI is below.
GATS Article XXI
1. (a) A Member (referred to in this Article as the "modifying 
Member") may modify or withdraw any commitment in its 
Schedule, at any time after three years have elapsed from the date 
on which that commitment entered into force, in accordance with 
the provisions of this Article.
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(b) A modifying Member shall notify its intent to modify or 
withdraw a commitment pursuant to this Article to the Council for 
Trade in Services no later than three months before the intended 
date o f implementation o f the modification or withdrawal.
2. (a) At the request of any Member the benefits o f which under 
this Agreement may be affected (referred to in this Article as an 
"affected Member") by a proposed modification or withdrawal 
notified under subparagraph 1(b), the modifying Member shall 
enter into negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on any 
necessary compensatory adjustment. In such negotiations and 
agreement, the Members concerned shall endeavour to maintain a 
general level of mutually advantageous commitments not less 
favourable to trade than that provided for in Schedules of specific 
commitments prior to such negotiations.
(b) Compensatory adjustments shall be made on a most-favoured­
nation basis.
3. (a) If agreement is not reached between the modifying 
Member and any affected Member before the end of the period 
provided for negotiations, such affected Member may refer the 
matter to arbitration. Any affected Member that wishes to enforce 
a right that it may have to compensation must participate in the 
arbitration.
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(b) If no affected Member has requested arbitration, the modifying 
Member shall be free to implement the proposed modification or 
withdrawal.
4. (a) The modifying Member may not modify or withdraw its 
commitment until it has made compensatory adjustments in 
conformity with the findings of the arbitration.
(b) If the modifying Member implements its proposed modification 
or withdrawal and does not comply with the findings o f the 
arbitration, any affected Member that participated in the arbitration 
may modify or withdraw substantially equivalent benefits in 
conformity with those findings. Notwithstanding Article 11, such a 
modification or withdrawal may be implemented solely with 
respect to the modifying Member.
5. The Council for Trade in Services shall establish procedures for 
rectification or modification of Schedules. Any Member which has 
modified or withdrawn scheduled commitments under this Article 
shall modify its Schedule according to such procedures.
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VI. Fleshing Out the GATT/GATS and the Possibility of Non-Violation’
It is possible that Article XX of the GATT, and/or Article XIV of the GATS will 
fail to justify a Canadian unilateral sanction imposed upon U.S. created AAUs by the 
reasoning discussed in the preceding sections. With this in mind, it is prudent to flesh out 
the text o f the GATT and the GATS more completely and examine alternative points of 
argument that may not as yet have been explored. Additionally, it is possible that, as in 
the Asbestos Appellate Decision, a WTO and/or NAFTA tribunal may find that trade in 
AAUs is in accordance with the GATT, the GATS, and the NAFTA. In order to explore 
the possibility of this option, the two core principles, common to all three agreements 
must be examined. Lastly, it is possible that trade in AAUs will not fall within the scope 
of the GATT/GATS or the NAFTA. The following section will first look to alternative 
arguments based on subtleties of semantics in the trade agreements, as well as the 
possibility for the U.S. to utilize the non-violation provisions of the GATT/GATS or the 
NAFTA. It will then turn to a close examination of the most favored nation, and national 
treatment principles, and discuss the conditions necessary to escape violation of these 
principles within an international emissions trading system. Lastly, this section will touch 
on the possibility o f AAUs falling outside the scope of these agreements.
A. Alternative Arguments
The arguments described below w ill be briefly introduced and explored in this paper, however as most 
issues have not been interpreted by a W TO/NAFTA dispute resolution panel, detailed analysis o f  how such 
a panel would rule on these issues w ill not be undertaken by the author.
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The discussions in the preceding sections analyzed the possibility for a Canadian 
ban on U.S. created AAUs to fall within the scope of the GATT, the GATS, or the 
NAFTA environmental exemptions. However, thus far this paper has only looked at this 
possibility based on arguments used in case law. It is possible that the text of these 
environmental exemptions, in particular the chapeau to Article XX, can be broken down 
further in search o f a valid argument. Furthermore, it is possible that the U.S., or other 
non-Kyoto WTO member nations will utilize the “non-violation” clause contained in the 
GATT and the GATS. The following section will discuss these two scenarios.
1. The Chapeau
An alternative argument requires looking back at the GATT Article XX 
chapeau.’’® The chapeau states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of a r b itr a r y  o r  u n ju stifiab le  
discrimination between countries where the sa m e  co n d itio n s  p r e v a il ,  or a 
d isg u ise d  re s tr ic tio n  on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures.. .[Emphasis added]
As discussed in Section IV(B)(l)(iii) above, based on past panel decisions, a Canadian 
sanction will likely be viewed by a NAFTA dispute resolution panel as “unjustifiable 
discrimination.” This is because the sanction may be seen to force policy changes in 
NAFTA member nations in order for the affected nation to gain market access into the
N A FTA  Chapter XXI Article 2101 defers to the GATT Chapter XX chapeau which states that the 
exemptions to GATT compliance as discussed above shall apply as long as they do not constitute: 
a m eans o f  arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail
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Canadian emissions trading market. However, the conditional part of the chapeau states 
that the sanction must meet this justifiable requirement “in countries where the same 
conditions prevail.” Therefore, one must now examine whether or not “the same 
conditions prevail” in the U.S. and Canada.*^' It can be argued that because, unlike the 
U.S., Canada is undergoing significant changes in its industrial sector to reduce CO2 and 
CO2 equivalent emissions to 1990 levels pursuant to its obligations under the Kyoto 
Protocol, the “same conditions” do not “prevail” in the two nations. Under these 
conditions the sanction would meet the exemption requirements o f NAFTA Chapter XXI, 
and corresponding GATT Article XX. As discussed in Section V{A)(1) above, it is 
interesting to note the shift in language between the GATT and the GATS with respect to 
this particular clause. The GATT requires that the “same conditions” prevail to meet the 
conditions of the clause, while the GATS only requires that “similar conditions” prevail. 
Clearly, this shift in language expands the scope of the GATS provisions and narrows the 
room for exception to these provisions under the agreement. It is difficult to ascertain 
how this argument would be interpreted as it pertains to the GATS because it has yet to 
be heard in such a context. It is unclear what conditions are sufficient to categorize 
conditions in two separate countries as “like” as opposed to “same.” Furthermore, it is 
unclear whether this difference in the use of words will be viewed as a mere semantics.
2. Nullification or Impairment
Pursuant to NAFTA Chapter XXI Article 2101(2);
Provided such measures are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means o f  
arbitrary or imjustifiable discrimination between countries where the sam e conditions 
p reva il  or a disguised restriction on trade between Parties 
[Emphasis added]
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The GATT Article XXII and the GATS Article XXIII contain language intended 
to further protect the member benefits under these two Agreements. These Articles allow 
a Party to file a complaint against another Party if  the former believes that its benefits 
under the GATT/GATS have been nullified or impaired. This clause allows for a 
complaint to be filed regardless o f whether the “offending” Party has violated any 
GATT’^̂  or GATS’^̂  provisions. These proceedings can result in one Party being 
authorized to “suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such 
concessions or other obligation under [the GATT],” or in the “modification or 
withdrawal o f the measure.”*’  ̂ Three specific elements must be present in order to 
establish an Article XXIII claim: 1) The existence o f an applied measure by a WTO 
Member; 2) The existence o f a benefit accruing under the relevant agreement; and 3) 
Nullification or impairment of the benefit as a result of the measure.
Under Article XXIII o f the GATT/GATS, the U.S. may have standing to seek 
compensation for a Canadian measure excluding their participation in an AAU market.
GATT Article XXIII states that:
I f  any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or 
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment o f  
any objective o f  the Agreement is being impeded as a result o f . ..
b) the application by another contracting party o f  any measure, whether or not it 
conflicts with the provisions o f  this A greem ent... 
the contracting party may, with a view  to the satisfactory adjustment o f  the matter, make 
written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it 
considers to be concerned....
GATS Article XXIII(3) states that:
I f  any Member considers that any benefit it could reasonably have expected to accrue to 
it under a specific commitment o f  another Member under Part III o f  this Agreement is 
being nullified or impaired as a result o f  the application o f  any measure which does not 
conflict with the provisions o f  this Agreement, it may have the recourse to the D S U ...
GATT Article XXIII(2)
GATS Article XXIII(3)
James P. Durling, and Simon N. Lester, O riginal M eanings and the Film Dispute: The Drafting H istoiy, 
Textual Evolution, and Application o f  the N on-violation Nullification or Impairment Remedy, 32 George 
W ashington Journal o f  International Law and Econom ics 2 1 1 at 240
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Two requirements must be met for a GATT Article XXIII complaint to be f i l e d . F i r s t ,  
“the measure in question cannot have reasonably been anticipated by the complaining 
party at the time the concession was negotiated.” ’’* Second, “the measure in question 
must have damaged the competitive position o f the imported product concerned.” '”
The U.S. will likely be able to meet the second requirement, because it is likely 
that the market value o f U.S. created AAUs will be very dependent on access to, and 
verification under, the Kyoto Protocol emissions trading system. Furthermore, past 
disputes under this issue have demonstrated^”  that a party need not prove definitive 
changes in trade flow before and after a measure was instituted. A party need merely 
prove that an “abstract adverse change in competition” ”̂  has occurred. One author 
argues that GATT/GATS Articles XXIII provide a “panacea” for invalid complaints."’  ̂
Although the laws and drafting of history may dictate a strict correlation between result 
and causation, the panels have not always interpreted the law in accordance with this 
standard.^’  ̂ The method by which a WTO dispute resolution panel analyzed and ruled on 
such issues is exemplified in the following landmark case involving a film manufacturing 
industry in Japan.
i) Fuji / Kodak Case
See Sung-joon Cho, GATT Non-Violation Issues in the WTO Framework: A re they the Achilles ’ H eel o f  
the D ispute Settlement Process, 39 Harvard International Law Journal 311 (1998) at 316 
id. at 316  
id. at 317
Treatment by Germany o f  Imports o f  Sardines, October 31, 1952. GATT B .l.S .D . (1953) 
supra  note 196 at 318 
at 324
See Durling supra  note 196 at 250
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In 1995, the U.S. filed a complaint against Japan regarding the Japanese film 
manufacturing market. The U.S. contended that even if  Japan had not violated any of the 
GATT provisions, some benefits to the U.S. as a GATT 1994 Member was nonetheless 
nullified or impaired. The U.S. claimed that Japan had performed actions to: 1) Create an 
exclusive distribution sector; 2) Restrict the growth of large stores; and 3) Restrict the use 
of sales promotions.^^'^ The panel eventually found the U.S. claims unfounded because 
the U.S. could not prove that the measures caused any nullification or impairment. 
However, this panel’s four step analysis o f GATT Article XXIII is noteworthy because it 
set guidelines for future panels on how to interpret this Article.
a) ActionableMeasure
First, the panel looked at the issue of what constitutes an actionable 
“measure” under Article XXIII. It clarified that the scope of a “measure” was 
greater than merely a ‘subsidy’ and could include virtually any type of 
government measure. In fact, it went so far as to allow for actions originating in 
the private sector that are actually “quasi-govemmental” in nature.^®^
b) Reasonable Anticipation of Benefits
Next, the panel analyzed what it means for a benefit to be “reasonably 
anticipated.” It ruled, in accordance with past GATT panels,^®  ̂that for benefits 
accruing from a measure to be legitimate, the challenged measure must not have 
been “reasonably anticipated” at the time that the tariff concession was
id. at 260  
id at 263 
^  at 263
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negotiated. Furthermore, the panel noted that in order for a measure to be 
“reasonably anticipated” the measure must have been introduced prior to the 
closing of the most recent round of tariff negotiations. However, not all cases are 
linked to tariff concessions. These types of cases are called “independent mode” 
cases, for which there is little history on how to base correct interpretation of this 
standard.
c) Nullification or Impairment as a Result o f the Measure
Thirdly, the Panel examined the relationship between the alleged
“nullification or impairment” and the applied measure in question. The Panel 
stated that it is imperative for the measure to have made more than a “de 
minimis contribution to the alleged nullification or impairment. In making 
this decision the panel set a fairly loose standard of causation.
d) Detailed Justification Standard
Lastly, the Panel examined the evidentiary standard which a Party must 
meet to show injury. Past Panels had used the “detailed justification standard,” 
requiring a Party to show “detailed justification” that the measure has caused 
nullification or impairment o f a reasonably anticipated benefit. The Panel veered 
from this interpretation and accepted U.S. claims that “detailed justification” was 
solely a pleading requirement rather than an evidentiary standard.^^^
207
For a more detailed discussion o f  “independent mode" cases see Cho supra  note 197 at 323-326  
See Durling supra  note 196 at 265
For a detailed legal analysis describing why the Panel was incorrect in this interpretation See Durling 
supra  note 196 at 268
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If future Panel decisions follow the lead o f the Fuji-Kodak Panel the U.S. will 
potentially feel justified in bringing a nullification or impairment suit before a WTO 
panel. Based on the four part analysis detailed above, it is likely that a measure 
restricting market access to a Canadian emissions trading market will constitute an 
actionable measure under GATT/GATS Article XXIII. It is also likely that there will be 
an economic impairment to the U.S. emissions trading market if  the U.S. is not allowed 
access. Thirdly, if  “detailed justification” is interpreted as solely a procedural pleading 
requirement, it should not be a difficult hurdle to overcome. Lastly, because of the lack of 
case law dictating guidelines for interpretation in “independent mode” cases,^'° the 
question of whether the U.S. is justified in reasonably anticipating benefits from 
Canadian emissions trading system is difficult to ascertain. It would seem that based on 
the market access provisions in the GATS and the Nation of Origin provisions under the 
GATT, the U.S. would be justified in anticipating the benefits o f market access to this 
trading system. However, without legal precedent on which to base this analysis, 
comment here would be purely speculative.
B. Non-Violation
There are two pathways by which a Canadian sanction on U.S. derived AAUs 
would withstand a GATT/GATS or NAFTA challenge. The first of these pathways is if 
the sanction is found to be consistent with Canada’s obligations under the GATT/GATS 
and/or the NAFTA. Specifically, the sanction would have to be consistent with the most
210 i.e. one not involving tariff concessions
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favored nation and national treatment principles o f these agreements. The second way in 
which the sanction could withstand a GATT/GATS and/or NAFTA challenge is if  AAUs 
were determined to be out of the scope o f these agreements. This would be the case if 
AAUs were determined to be neither goods nor services, and therefore trade in these 
entities would not be subject to Member obligations under these agreements. These two 
alternatives will be discussed in the following sections.
1. MFN and National Treatment Principles
The WTO Asbestos Appellate Body decision^"' reflects a landmark decision in its 
ruling for the first time that a unilateral sanction excluding certain products from the 
French market, did not violate the most favored nation or national treatment principles.^ 
As discussed above, the Appellate Body focused on the term “like product,” and reached 
the conclusion that asbestos products manufactured in Canada were not “like products” to 
the substitute products manufactured in France. The WTO defines the term “like product” 
as “a product which is identical, i.e., alike in all respects to the product under 
consideration or, in the absence of such a product which, although not alike in all 
respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under 
consideration.” '̂^ The Appellate Body classified “like products” based on the following
■' ' A s discussed in Section IV (A )(4) above
The most favored nation principle states that no contracting Party shall procure:
any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity, granted by any contracting party to an 
product originating in .. .any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like products originating...in all other contracting parties.
The national treatment principle states that no contracting Party shall :
be accorded treatment no less favorable than that to like products o f  national origin in 
 ̂ respect to all laws, regulations, and requirements affecting their internal sale.
www.wto.org Found 5/26/02
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criteria: 1) physical properties o f the products; 2) the end uses o f the product; 3) 
consumers’ tastes and habits; 4) tariff classification; and (5) the risk associated with the 
product?''^ It is possible that through similar analysis Canadian and U.S. created AAUs 
also be found not “like products.”
i) Physical Properties o f  AAUs
If AAUs are classified as products, the physical properties o f AAUs created in the 
U.S. versus those created in Canada will remain virtually identical. One cannot 
distinguish between carbon emissions on a physical basis, therefore this point will not 
likely carry any weight in establishing a significant difference between AAUs created in 
Canada versus those created in the U.S.
ii) End Uses o f  AA Us
The end uses of AAUs created in the U.S., in contrast to those created in Canada, 
provide a platform to argue that these products/services are “like.” AAUs created in 
Canada, or any other Kyoto Protocol member nation, will be used to meet emission 
reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. Even if Canada is forced to accept AAUs 
created in the U.S., or any other non-Kyoto Protocol member nation, into a Canadian 
market these AAUs will likely not be permitted for use to meet these obligations. 
Therefore, the end uses o f these two products/services are fundamentally disparate.
214 supra  note 139
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ni) Consumer Tastes and Habits
Consumer tastes and habits also provide a platform on which to argue that AAUs 
created in the U.S. and Canada are not “like” products/services. Based on the author’s 
experience brokering emission reduction credits domestically in the U.S., there are two 
major issues governing consumer tastes and habits with respect to purchasing emission 
reduction credits. The first concern consumer’s have is; will the appropriate regulatory 
body recognize the credits for the purposes o f compliance with appropriate regulations? 
Consumers will likely prefer to purchase AAUs that are certain to be recognized by the 
Canadian government. Furthermore, when the Canadian government is the consumer, it 
is even more likely that the consumer will prefer to purchase AAUs that can be used to 
meet Canadian obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. The second concern consumers 
often have with respect to purchase of emission reduction credits is the price of the 
credits. AAUs created in the U.S. would likely cost less because of the associated risk 
that the credits may not be recognized by the Canadian government. However, because 
of the cost associated with creating emission reduction credits, this price differential will 
likely not be enough to override the risk factor. Therefore, consumer tastes and habits 
may indicate that U.S. and Canadian created AAUs are not “like” products/services.
iv) Tariff Classification o f  AA Us
For all intents and purposes, apart from meeting obligations under the Kyoto 
Protocol, all AAUs are identical. Therefore, this paper will assume that AAUs created in
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the U.S. and those created in Canada will be similarly classified with respect to tariffs. 
Under this assumption, tariff classification does not support the argument.
v) Risk Associated With Use o f  AA Us
As discussed above, in conjunction with ‘consumer tastes and habits,’ the primary 
risk associated with the use o f U.S. created AAUs is that the credits will not be 
recognized by the Canadian government for the purposes of compliance with domestic 
and/or international obligations. If consumers purchase credits that cannot be used for 
compliance, they face the risk of economic loss through penalties and/or the necessity to 
purchase valid credits that can be used for compliance. The Asbestos Appellate Body 
decided that a French ban on Canadian asbestos products was justified because the 
Canadian product had an associated health risk. In the case o f a Canadian ban on U.S. 
created AAUs, the risk is economic, not health related.
If by the reasoning above, AAUs created in non-Kyoto Protocol member nations 
are not considered “like” products/services to those created within a Kyoto Protocol 
member nation, trade in AAUs will likely fall outside the scope of the GATT, the GATS, 
and the NAFTA national treatment and most favored nation principles. Therefore, if  a 
U.S. created quantified emission reduction is not a “like” product/service to a Kyoto 
Protocol approved AAU, it would likely not be subject to equal treatment under NAFTA,
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which prohibits quantitative restrictions on “like, directly competitive, or substitutable 
products” from member nations.^
2. AAUs: Not Within the Scope of the WTO or NAFTA
Although the literature on this topic is sparse, those who have written on 
the topic of AAU classification^'^ find it very possible that AAUs will not be 
considered neither “goods” nor “services” under the WTO or the NAFTA. The 
UNCTAD suggests that the WTO may view AAUs as neither goods nor services 
because AAUs “exist by virtue of an international agreement and their sole use is 
for meeting sovereign obligations under that agreement.”^'^ Under this scenario, 
restricting trade in AAUs to Kyoto Protocol member nations would not be subject 
to WTO or NAFTA rules. However, these authors also recognize that “in the 
absence of a WTO ruling, the risk remains that WTO rules apply [to trade in 
AAUs].”^'^ AAUs represent a completely new “commodity,” which could 
warrant a completely new category of classification under the WTO and/or the 
NAFTA. Furthermore, since AAUs are proving so difficult to classify, this 
uncertainty could leave room for a politically motivated decision, one therefore 
even more difficult to predict.
Pursuant to NAFTA Chapter III Articles 301,302 and 309  
See Werksman, Petsonk, Parker, Amin et.al., and UNCTAD  
See UNCTAD supra  note 22 at 63 
UNCTAD supra  note 22 at 63
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VII. Can the NAAEC Protect Canadian Climate Change Policy?
With regard to a potential NAFTA conflict between Canada and the U.S. 
(or Mexico) over AAU trading, the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation (NAAEC) may hold the solution. The NAAEC requires that NAFTA 
member nations enforce and improve their environmental standards and policies. 
Under these requirements, Canada may be able to institute domestic policy 
restrictions on trade in AAUs so long as the policy is clearly designed to protect 
the environment. The NAAEC protects domestic environmental legislation. 
Therefore, it probably does not matter if  AAUs are classified as “products” or 
“services.”
The NAAEC may offer protection for Canada if  the trade restrictions 
embedded in the Kyoto Protocol"”  come under attack by non-Kyoto Protocol 
parties that are member to the NAFTA.""*’ The following section will provide a 
detailed description o f the environmental protection measures provided for in the 
NAAEC, discuss the process by which those environmental protection measures 
can be enforced, and finally discuss how Canada may be able to use this 
agreement to justify domestic implementation of the trade restrictions mandated 
by the Kyoto Protocol.
A. NAAEC: Environmental Protection Provisions
i.e. restrictions on trade in ERUs, AAUs, CERs, and RM Us to Kyoto Protocol Party nations 
Note, the WTO does not have a congruent agreement to the NAAEC, therefore this argument applies 
only non-compliance charges brought forth by the U.S. or M exico.
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As discussed in Section 11(C)(3) above, the NAAEC was negotiated by the 
Clinton Administration to gain political support for the passage of the NAFTA. 
The NAAEC clearly sets the stage for the pro-environmental protection 
standpoint detailed in the preamble o f the Agreement. The NAAEC contains 
measures allowing for the: (1) enhancement o f domestic environmental policies;
(2) investigation of charges involving inadequate enforcement o f domestic 
environmental policies; (3) arbitration o f environmental disputes; and (4) 
sanctioning of members found to be in violation o f NAAEC requirements.^^' 
Additionally, the NAAEC established a new body known as the North American 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC) to ensure that the NAAEC 
requirements are met, and to handle dispute resolution under these requirements. 
The specific stipulations are cited below.
• NAAEC Preamble
The preamble emphasizes the importance of sustainable development and 
intergenerational equity to the protection of the environment. It links the 
importance of environmental protection to sustained economic growth. The 
preamble stresses the “importance o f the conservation, protection, and 
enhancement of the environment,” as well as the “essential role o f cooperation 
[among parties] in achieving sustainable development for the well-being of
David S. Baron, NAFTA- M aking the Side Agreem ent Work, 12 Arizona Journal o f  International and 
Comparative Law 603 (1995)
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present and future g e n e r a t io n s .T h e s e  statements do not equivocate in their 
purpose of environmental protection.
•  Enforcement o f  Domestic Environmental Policy
The NAAEC goes on to state specifically that all member nations must 
“enhance compliance with, and enforcement of environmental laws and 
regulations.”^̂  ̂ Additionally, ‘interested persons’ have the right to request action 
in response to a violation of this stipulation by instigating administrative, quasi­
judicial, or judicial proceedings.^^'* Again, as in the preamble, the text is clearly 
biased towards protection of national sovereignty in the case of domestic 
environmental policy.
• Enhancement o f  Domestic Environmental Policy
The NAAEC not only requires that member nations effectively enforce 
their environmental policies already in place, but also uses the harmonization 
principle to require member nations to improve on these policies. Harmonization 
ensures that the country with the least stringent environmental protection 
regulations does not become the common denominator. The NAAEC states that 
members must “foster the protection and improvement of the environment,” they
supra  note 63 a t preamble 
supra  note 63 at Article 1(g)
Sandra Le Priol-Vrejan, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreem ent and the P ow er to Investigate 
Violations o f  Environmental Laws, 23 Hofstra Law R eview  483 (1994)
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must “better conserve, protect, and enhance the environment,” they must “ensure 
that its laws and regulations provide for a high level o f environmental protection, 
and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations.” Additionally, 
each Party must “effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations 
through appropriate governmental action.”
• Creation o f  the CEC
Central to the NAAEC is the creation of the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation (CEC). Among other duties, the CEC provides a forum through 
which Parties, individuals, or NGOs, can resolve disputes surrounding a Party’s 
failure to enforce its environmental regulations.
•  Arbitration on Environmental Disputes
When disputes arise surrounding the requirements of the NAAEC, any 
Party may commence formal consultation with any other Party accused o f being 
in violation. If Parties are unable to reach resolution through this consultation 
process, the Council can choose to defer the issue to a five member arbitral 
Panel.^^^ This process will be discussed in more detail in Section VI(C) below.
supra  note 63 at. Article 1(a), (c). Article 3, and Article 5
Each Party involved in the dispute chooses two o f  the five panelists from an existing list prepared by the 
Council, The fifth panelist, the Chair, is agreed upon by both Parties or else chosen for the Parties by a 
third uninvolved party. See supra  note 198 at 606.
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B. Options for Enforcement: Potential for Protection
Based on the requirements described above, the NAAEC may permit for 
Canada to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and incorporate its policies into Canadian law 
without breaching its NAFTA obligations. This could happen in one of two ways. 
First, NAAEC rules allowing for the improvement o f environmental regulations 
among member nations may be employed to justify the rules contained in the 
Kyoto Protocol. Second, the NAAEC rules requiring member nations to enforce 
their environmental regulations may be employed to uphold the rules contained in 
the Kyoto Protocol. Each of these arguments will be explored below.
The NAAEC permits member nations to improve their domestic 
environmental policy. The Kyoto Protocol is indeed a policy designed to protect 
and improve the quality o f the env ironm ent.T herefo re , if Canada chooses to 
adopt and incorporate the Protocol into its own legislation, the trade measures 
included therein may be protected by NAAEC Articles 1(a), 1(c), 3, and 5^^ 
allowing for improvement o f environmental regulations.
The CEC can only hear cases related to the failure of a member 
government to enforce its environmental regulations. Therefore, if  the Canadian 
government chooses to accept U.S. derived AAUs in hopes of avoiding such a
See discussion in Section 11(A) above.
Additionally, Article 2(1) requires that each Party shall “promote the use o f  econom ic instruments for 
the efficient achievement o f  environmental goals.” This may provide safe harbor for the use o f  an 
international em issions trading system.
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U.S. challenge, any resident or resident organization o f Canada, the U.S., or 
Mexico may be in a position to challenge this decision. Any such party could 
claim that Canada would not be enforcing its environmental policies as dictated 
by the Kyoto Protocol in allowing U.S. derived AAUs into the Canadian market. 
Article V of the Kyoto Protocol specifies that AAUs can be transferred among 
Kyoto Protocol Party nations;
Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, 
which a Party acquires from another Party in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be added to the assigned 
amount for the acquiring Party...
Any emission reduction units, or part of an assigned amount, 
which a Party acquires transfers to another Party in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be subtracted from the 
assigned amount for the transferring Party.
Furthermore, Article 17 o f the Kyoto Protocol stipulates:
Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading 
for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3. Any 
such trading [emphasis added] shall be supplemental to domestic actions 
for the purposes of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under that Article.
These statements can be interpreted in one of two ways. On the one hand, if  the 
U.S. is not a Kyoto Protocol member nation, engaging in international emissions 
trading as defined by the Kyoto Protocol will clearly not be “supplemental to 
domestic actions for the purposes of meeting...commitments under” Article 3.
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Therefore, it can be inferred that by engaging in emissions trading with the United 
States, Canada would be engaging in an illegal trade as defined by the Kyoto 
Protocol. On the other hand, although the Kyoto Protocol explicitly states who a 
Party nation can trade with, it does not necessarily state who a Party cannot trade 
with. Articles 3 and 6 of the Kyoto Protocol state the following:
Article 3
10. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned 
amount, which a Party acquires from another Party in accordance 
with the provisions o f Article 6 or o f Article 17 shall be added to 
the assigned amount for the acquiring Party.
11. Any emission reduction units, or any part o f an assigned 
amount, which a Party transfers to another Party in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 6 or o f Article 17 shall be subtracted 
from the assigned amount for the transferring Party.
In addition, Article 6 states as follows:
Article 6
1. For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any 
Party included in Annex 1““  ̂may transfer to, or acquire from, any 
other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects
229 Annex I o f  the UNFCCC generally corresponds to Annex B o f  the Kyoto Protocol
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aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or 
enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in 
any sector o f the economy, provided that:
(a) Any such project has the approval o f the Parties involved;
(b) Any such project provides a reduction in emissions by sources, 
or an enhancement o f removals by sinks, that is additional to any 
that would otherwise occur;
(c) It does not acquire any emission reduction units if  it is not in 
compliance with its obligations under Articles 5 and 7; and
(d) The acquisition of emission reduction units shall be 
supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes of meeting 
commitments under Article 3.
Article 3 clearly stated that a Party can account for ERUs or AAUs acquired from, 
or transferred to, another Party. However, Article 3 does not state that a Party may 
not account for ERUs or AAUs acquired from, or transferred to, a non-Party. 
Similarly, Article 6 stipulates that Parties may acquire or transfer ERUs resulting 
from ‘projects’ from any other Party. Again, it does not stipulate that Party 
nations may not engage in such actions with non-Parties. Articles 6 (c) and (d) 
stipulate that in order to participate in this process, Parties must comply with 
Articles 5 and 7, and also that any such actions must be supplemental to domestic 
actions. However, because the U.S. will presumably not be a Party to the Kyoto 
Protocol, it is not bound by these rules.
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Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol does not hold Parties responsible for the 
compliance obligations of their trading partners. Therefore, since neither the 
Kyoto Protocol, nor the Marrakesh Accords specifically prohibit Party nations 
from trading with non-Party nations, Canada’s obtaining AAUs from the U.S. 
may not be seen as an example o f a failure to enforce Canadian environmental 
regulations. In any event, this challenge may allege the failure of a NAFTA 
member government to enforce its environmental laws and under these 
circumstances would therefore be heard by the CEC. The process involved in 
such a hearing is described below.
C. Dispute Resolution Under the CEC: Process and Procedures
Dispute resolution surrounding a NAFTA member nation’s failure to 
enforce its environmental regulations is handled exclusively by the CEC. The 
CEC is made up of a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory 
Committee (JPAC). The Council is the governing body, the Secretariat is the 
administrative body, and the JPAC is a public advisory body to the two 
aforementioned groups.’ ®̂
As mentioned above. Article 14 o f the NAAEC is unique in that it grants 
standing to public citizens and non-govemmental organizations (NGOs) to file 
complaints against the government o f any member nation for the 1 after’s alleged
230 supra  note 221 at 606
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failure to enforce its environmental regulations. Public citizens and NGOs must 
submit a complaint to the Secretariat detailing how the accused party has failed to 
enforce its environmental laws effectively. Complainants must meet a number of 
procedural requirements for a submission to the Secretariat to be approved and 
reviewed.^^' If these requirements are met, the Secretariat may then decide to 
dismiss the complaint, or request a response from the Party in violation.^^^ In 
making this decision, the Secretariat must examine and “be guided by”^̂  ̂ the 
following criteria: (1 ) the party submitting the complaint must allege harm; (2) the 
submission must raise issues that will further the purposes of the Side Agreement;
(3) private remedies under the Party’s law must have been previously pursued; 
and (4) the submission must be drawn exclusively from mass media reports.^^"^
Based on the requirements described above, it is likely that the Secretariat 
will be justified in requesting a response from the Canadian government if a 
complaint is filed due to Canada’s failure to enforce the requirements o f the 
Kyoto P ro toco l.S ubsequen tly , the Secretariat may seek approval from the 
Council to file a “factual record” to document the allegations. Alternatively, the 
Secretariat may choose to dismiss the complaint if  certain criteria are not met.
For a list o f  these requirements see supra  note 221 at 607 Additionally, for an excellent discussion o f  
the entire dispute resolution system under the NAAEC see John Knox, A N ew Approach to Compliance 
with Internationa! Environmental Law: The Submissions Procedure o f  the NAFTA Environmental 
Commission, 28 Ecology Law Quarterly 1 (2001)
If a complaint is initiated by a NAFTA Party, an individual or an NGO, the CEC has limited 
powers o f  investigation. However, the scope o f  the CEC's investigative powers is unclear in that 
the NAAEC does not specify what materials the CEC m ay request from a Party nor does it dictate 
that the member Party must surrender such materials when requested. See supra  note 184 at 500  
supi'a note 63 at Article 14.2 
^  supi-a note 63 Article 14.2
If those requirements are implemented dom estically by statute.
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For example, the Secretariat may dismiss a claim if  the failure to enforce an 
environmental law^^^ reflects “a reasonable exercise of official discretion in 
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, or compliance m a t t e r s . T h e  Secretariat 
may also dismiss a charge if it relates to occupational safety and health laws or to 
laws primarily aimed at the management of natural resources.^^* Additionally, the 
Secretariat has refijsed to permit Article 14 submissions challenging any 
legislative action that diminishes environmental law enforcement.^^^ If the 
creation of a “factual record” is approved by the Council,^"*® it may lead to further 
investigation by the Secretariat, comment by the Parties involved,^* '̂ and 
potentially the public release of the “factual record” if  such a release is approved
Article 25(2){b) o f  the NAAEC defines an environmental law as any law whose:
primary purpose... is the protection o f  the environment, or the prevention o f  a danger to human life or health, 
through,
(i) the prevention, abatement, or control o f  the release, discharge, or em ission o f  pollutants or 
environmental contaminanats,
( ii)  the control o f  environmentall hazardous or toxic chem icals, substances, materials, and wates, and the 
dissemination o f  information related thereto, or
(iii) the protection o f  w ild flora or fauna, including endangered species, their habitat, and specially  
protected natural areas...
supra  note 43 at 211. For additional discussion o f  the criteria see supra  note 66 at 608 
supra  note 43 at 211. This stipulation raises an interesting rift between the NAAEC and the general 
exemptions o f  NAFTA Chapter 21. The NAFTA Chapter 21 exemptions require that in order for an 
exemption to be invoked, the measure in question must be primarily aimed at the conservation o f  a natural 
resource. In contrast, the N AAEC stipulated the opposite, it’s ‘exem ptions’ may be dism issed in cases 
where the law in question is related to the management o f  a natural resource. Therefore, it may be the case 
that because o f  this difference in verbiage, arguments related to NAAEC ‘exem ptions’ could not be used in 
conjunction with arguments citing the provisions o f  the N A FTA  Chapter 21 exemptions to build a case 
protecting Canadian implementation o f  the Kyoto Protocol. In other words, in it’s defense to a U.S. 
challenge under NAFTA, Canada m ay not be able to argue protection under the NAAEC as w ell as under 
Chapter 21 for domestic policy aimed at environmental protection. Canada would be forced to chose to 
argue either that the Kyoto Protocol was a law designed to protect natural resource under Chapter 21, or 
that the Kyoto Protocol is not primarily aimed at the management o f  natural resources and thereby fair 
game to be heard by the NAAEC.
supra  note 43 at 212. For examples o f  dismissed cases based on this criteria see SEM -95-001 and 
SEM -95-002. In these cases the CEC dismissed charges challenging Canadian suspension o f  enforcement 
o f  the U.S. Endangered Species Act and the elimination o f  private sector remedies to review U.S. salvage 
logging sales.
The NAAEC does not provide guidelines under which the Council must make it’s decision as to this 
matter.
The Secretariat maintains discretion over whether or not to incorporate these comments into the final 
document. See supra  note 61 at Article 15(6).
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by the Council.^"^  ̂ However, in the case of a citizen or NGO challenge of a 
member nation’s failure to enforce environmental policy, this release of 
information is the only “sanction” available against the party at fault.^'’̂  
Additionally, as the name implies, the “factual record” is simply a statement of 
facts involved in the case, and does not issue any binding ruling ordering the 
Party at fault to enforce their environmental regulations effectively. Some authors 
argue that the ability o f the CEC to function effectively as a regulatory body is 
severely limited.
IIX. Alternative Potential for Trade Conflict
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the classification of AAUs, there are 
other aspects of the Kyoto Protocol which may lead Parties to take actions in 
conflict with their WTO or NAFTA obligations. Each Party will be responsible 
for the allocation o f allowances or permits domestically. Depending on the 
method of allocation in each member nation, it is possible that the allocation of 
allowances or emission permits may conflict with member obligations under these 
trade agreements. Additionally, the manner in which countries enforce permit 
requirements could potentially conflict with NAFTA and/or WTO obligations. 
These two scenarios are described below.
A s o f  the publication o f  Knox supra  note 190 (2001), the Council had only permitted the public release 
o f  two factual records.
supra  note 43 at 214. There are however additional sanctions available as a result o f  the NAAEC arbitral 
process. Under this process, the government o f  any member nation may request the establishment o f  an 
arbitral panel to hear a dispute concerning any other member nations' “persistent pattern o f failure” to 
enforce it’s environmental laws. If a Party is found guilty o f  this charge monetary penalties may be 
imposed on the offending Party. 
supra  note 224
92
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A. Allocation and Enforcement
If allocation of AAUs are made in such a way as to constitute an 
‘actionable subsidy’̂ "*̂ or a ‘regulatory measure that confers financial benefit,’ the 
Party may violate the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures. This Agreement prohibits government subsidies with very few 
exemptions.^'^^ The UNCTAD has indicated that if  allowances are allocated to 
certain entities in such a way as to confer a surplus (i.e. in excess to what is 
needed for operation), this surplus may be construed as a ‘financial contribution’ 
from the government, and therefore potentially in violation of the Agreement.^"^^
Alternatively, a Party may find itself in violation of WTO and/or NAFTA 
rules depending on where it decides to impose the ‘point of enforcement.’ 
Broadly speaking, Parties have three choices with respect to the ‘point of 
enforcement.’ They can require surrender o f allowances (1) upstream, at the point 
of fossil fuel extraction, sale or transport; (2) downstream, at the point of emission 
or; (3) utilize a hybrid o f these two systems. UNCTAD has indicated that if
The WTO Subsidies Agreement defines an ‘actionable subsidy’ as ‘(1) a non-c?é’ minimus ‘financial 
contribution’ that (2) is bestowed on ‘specific’ enterprises or industries; and (3) causes or threatens ‘injury’ 
or ‘serious prejudice’ to foreign manufacturers or like products” See Richard R. Parker, Designs fo r  
D om estic Carbon Emissions Trading: Comments on WTO Aspects. The H. John Heinz Center for Science, 
Econom ics, and the Environment, June 1990 at 2 Parker explains that a non- de minimus financial 
contribution is one that yields a benefit, directly or indirectly, that is greater than one percent o f  the 
receiving firm’s total sales o f  all products or, i f  the subsidy is limited to certain products, one percent o f  the 
firm’s total sales o f  the subsidized products.
A  prohibited subsidy is defined in the agreement as a ‘‘financial contribution that confers a benefit on a 
specific enterprise or industry or group o f  enterprises or industries” (UNCTAD supra  note 22 at 63)
For a more detailed discussion o f  this issue see supra  note 22 at 64
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allowances for fossil fuels are demanded upstream, or ‘at the border,’ this may
account for a quantitative restriction on trade 248
Additionally, this scenario raises the question o f how to allow market 
access to non-Kyoto Protocol Party exporters; and how non-Parties can acquire 
and account for AAUs required for surrender at the border. If AAU surrender is 
required at the border, and non-Kyoto Protocol Parties are not allowed market 
access, Kyoto Protocol Parties can only trade in energy related goods and services 
(i.e. fossil fuels) with other Kyoto Protocol Parties. It is very likely that under this 
scenario Parties would be in conflict with their obligations under the GATT, the 
GATS, or the NAFTA. On the other hand, if  non-Parties are allowed market 
access, it is unclear whether they also create AAUs domestically and trade them 
on the open market. If so, this will create a huge disincentive for countries to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Under this scenario, non-Parties can reap the economic 
benefits of an emissions trading system without the economic hardship associated 
with fulfilling other Kyoto Protocol emission reduction requirements.
The second alternative, downstream surrender, is more likely avoid WTO 
and/or NAFTA conflicts. However this approach limits the scope of total carbon 
emissions covered. This system can only cover approximately half of all carbon
This argument would obviously only apply if  A A U s are classified as goods or services and therefore 
subject to NAFTA requirements.
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emissions.^'^^ Mobile sources, such as private passenger vehicles, are difficult to 
regulate and would likely fall outside of the extent of coverage.
The third model, the hybrid system, combines various aspects of the two 
aforementioned systems. The hybrid system is similar to a downstream approach 
in that utilities and large industrial sources are required to hold allowances to 
account for their emissions. However, the hybrid system borrows from the 
upstream approach in that domestic fuel distributors must also hold allowances 
for small fuel users such as private passenger vehicles."^^ The idea behind this 
approach is that fuel distributors will pass the cost associated with holding 
allowances onto the consumer/emission source by raising gas prices, thereby 
pressuring consumers to switch to less carbon intensive fuel sources?^' Although 
the hybrid system incorporates aspects o f the upstream system, it diminishes the 
need for quantitative control ‘at the border.’ Therefore, this system is less likely to 
come into conflict with GATT obligations. Additionally, by requiring fuel 
suppliers to hold allowances this system is far more inclusive of the entire scope 
of carbon emissions.
Supra note 22 at 78
This system would also fall short o f  accounting for cross border traffic, i.e. passenger vehicles buying 
gasoline in the U.S. and driving into Canada.
See Zhong Xiang Zhang, Greenhouse Gas Em issions Trading and the W orld Trading System, 32(5) 
Journal o f  World Trade 219 (1998)
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IX. Conclusions
Given the lack of precedent, it is difficult to determine with any degree of 
certainty how the WTO or the NAFTA may classify AAUs. Some analysts may 
argue that because the trade restrictions under other ME As such as the Montreal 
Protocol, the Basel Convention and CITES have not been challenged, it is 
unlikely that a similar challenge will arise under the Kyoto Protocol. However, 
because the potential economic impact associated with the Kyoto Protocol is far 
greater than that associated with any o f its predecessor MEAs, it is likely to attract 
more attention from the international community. Therefore, it is prudent to 
analyze all possible grounds for conflict with existing trade agreements and 
prepare for such conflicts before they arise.
Specifically, it is imperative that negotiations be held between the U.S. 
and Canada with the intention o f placing the Kyoto Protocol on the list of 
exempted MEAs in NAFTA Chapter 1, Article 104. Some may argue that 
because the U.S. is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol, it will not be willing to 
exempt the Kyoto Protocol from NAFTA obligations. However, the U.S. has 
agreed to exempt other MEAs, such as the Basel Convention, from NAFTA 
obligations to which the U.S. is also a non-party. Nevertheless, the U.S. will 
likely reject such an exemption based on its interest in taking part in the 
international emissions trading market. The Bush Alternative to the Kyoto 
Protocol is an indication of such an interest. It seems that the creation o f the
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alternative agreement was not only an effort to save face in front o f the 
international community but also an attempt to participate in an economically 
viable emissions trading market. It is possible that this half hearted attempt at a 
national alternative may provide access to an international emissions trading 
market.^^^ In fact,a pilot project called the Chicago Climate Exchange is already 
underway establishing a domestic greenhouse gas market with hopes of 
eventually expanding to international trade.
Lastly, albeit not ideal, if non-Kyoto Protocol member nations with 
domestic trading systems comparable to those contained in the Kyoto Protocol are 
simply allowed market access, it is possible that NAFTA and/or WTO challenge 
may be avoided altogether. However, currently there does not exist a comparable 
system with legally binging emissions reduction commitments. If the U.S. 
establishes a parallel trading system and attempts to take part in the emissions 
trading system established under the Kyoto Protocol without committing to 
legally binding emission reduction targets, it is likely that member nations will 
strongly oppose such an action. One author argues however, that ‘real’ emission 
reductions created in non-Kyoto Protocol party nations are preferable, from an 
environmental standpoint, to ‘hot air’ credits.*^^ Additionally, this author argues 
that by allowing U.S. participation in the market, lower cost credits created in the 
U.S. would drive down the price o f AAUs to make them more accessible to
This option may provide the U.S. with the argument for an option which is “less inconsistent" with 
Member obligations under the NAFTA and the WTO.
Some authors predict that without U.S. participation, the em issions trading market will largely be based 
on “hot air.” See Hagen, Cathrine et. al., From Sm all to Insignificant: Climate Im pact o f  the Kyoto  
P rotocol with and without U.S., Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, at 5
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European companies.^^'* Some suggest that even in the absence of binding 
commitments, it is likely that based on “expectations regarding future regulatory 
requirements,” U.S. emissions in 2010 may be lower than its normal baseline.^^^ 
Others warn o f the danger o f double counting and/or overselling if  multiple 
trading systems attempt to overlap."^^
The question o f whether Canada will be forced to allow non-Kyoto 
Protocol nations that are Party to WTO and/or NAFTA, market access to the 
Canadian greenhouse gas emissions trading system is very difficult to answer. 
Many factors require consideration, and there are no concrete legal guidelines to 
answer the question. This paper has attempted to show some potential scenarios 
under which Canada may come into conflict with its obligations under the WTO 
and NAFTA by restricting market access to the U.S. (or any other NAFTA or 
WTO member nation). Additionally, this paper has suggested some harbors 
which may provide protection for Canada from a WTO and/or NAFTA challenge. 
Once the WTO has officially classified AAUs, or rejected them from the trading 
system, this discussion can be markedly more pointed, or perhaps not necessary at 
all. However, in the meantime, it provides an interesting and relevant point of 
discussion, as well as highlights some of the inconsistencies and weaknesses of 
the system designed to address AAUs.
See Diringir at 2
See Manne, Alan et. al., U.S. Rejection o f  the K yoto  Protocol: The Im pact on Compliance Costs and  
CO : Emissions, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies (2001)
See Nordhaus, Robert, et. al.. International Em issions Trading Rules as a Compliance Tool: lllta t is 
Necessary. Effective, and Workable? Environmental Law Reporter (2000)
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Appendix A
Annex B Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria*
Canada
Croatia*
Czech Republic*
Denmark
Estonia*
European Community
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary*
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia*
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Liechtenstein
Lithuania*
Luxembourg
Monaco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland*
Portugal
Romania*
Russian Federation*
Slovakia*
Slovenia*
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine*
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
United States o f America
* Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
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Appendix B
GATS Annex on Financial Services
1. Scope and Definition
(a) This Annex applies to measures affecting the supply of 
financial services. Reference to the supply o f a financial 
service in this Annex shall mean the supply o f a service as 
defined in paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Agreement.
(b) For the purposes of subparagraph 3(b) of Article I of the 
Agreement, "services supplied in the exercise of governmental 
authority” means the following:
(i) activities conducted by a central bank or monetary authority 
or by any other public entity in pursuit of monetary or exchange 
rate policies;
(ii) activities forming part of a statutory system of social 
security or public retirement plans; and
(iii) other activities conducted by a public entity for the 
account or with the guarantee or using the financial resources 
of the Government.
(c) For the purposes of subparagraph 3(b) of Article I of the 
Agreement, if a Member allows any of the activities referred to 
in subparagraphs (b) (ii) or (b) (iii) of this paragraph to be 
conducted by its financial service suppliers in competition with 
a public entity or a financial service supplier, "services” shall 
include such activities.
(d) Subparagraph 3(c) of Article I of the Agreement shall not 
apply to services covered by this Annex.
2. Domestic Regulation
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a 
Member shall not be prevented from taking measures for 
prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, 
depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is 
owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity 
and stability of the financial system. Where such measures do 
not conform with the provisions of the Agreement, they shall 
not be used as a means of avoiding the Member's commitments 
or obligations under the Agreement.
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(b) Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to require a 
Member to disclose information relating to the affairs and 
accounts of individual customers or any confidential or 
proprietary information in the possession of public entities.
3. Regulation
(a) A Member may recognize prudential measures of any other 
country in determining how the Member's measures relating to 
financial services shall be applied. Such recognition, which may 
be achieved through harmonization or otherwise, may be based 
upon an agreement or arrangement with the country concerned 
or may be accorded autonomously.
(b) A Member that is a party to such an agreement or 
arrangement referred to in subparagraph (a) , whether future 
or existing, shall afford adequate opportunity for other 
interested Members to negotiate their accession to such 
agreements or arrangements, or to negotiate comparable ones 
with it, under circumstances in which there would be 
equivalent regulation, oversight, implementation of such 
regulation, and, if appropriate, procedures concerning the 
sharing of information between the parties to the agreement or 
arrangement. Where a Member accords recognition 
autonomously, it shall afford adequate opportunity for any 
other Member to demonstrate that such circumstances exist.
(c) Where a Member is contemplating according recognition to 
prudential measures of any other country, paragraph 4(b) of 
Article VII shall not apply.
4. Dispute Settlement
Panels for disputes on prudential issues and other financial 
matters shall have the necessary expertise relevant to the 
specific financial service under dispute.
5. Definitions
For the purposes of this Annex:
(a) A financial service is any service of a financial nature 
offered by a financial service supplier of a Member. Financial 
services include all insurance and insurance-related services, 
and all banking and other financial services (excluding 
insurance) . Financial services include the following activities:
I n s u r a n c e  a n d  i n s u r a n c e - r e l a t e d  s e r v i c e s
(i) Direct insurance (including co-insurance) :
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(A) life
(B) non-life
(ii) Reinsurance and retrocession;
(iii) Insurance intermediation, such as brokerage and agency;
(iv) Services auxiliary to insurance, such as consultancy, 
actuarial, risk assessment and claim settlement services.
B a n k i n g  a n d  o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s  ( e x c l u d i n g  i n s u r a n c e )
(v) Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the 
public;
(vi) Lending of all types, including consumer credit, mortgage 
credit, factoring and financing of commercial transaction;
(vii) Financial leasing;
(viii) All payment and money transmission services, including 
credit, charge and debit cards, travellers cheques and bankers 
drafts;
(ix) Guarantees and commitments;
(x) Trading for own account or for account of customers, 
whether on an exchange, in an over-the-counter market or 
otherwise, the following:
(A) money market instruments (including cheques, bills, 
certificates of deposits) ;
(B) foreign exchange;
(C) derivative products including, but not limited to, futures 
and options;
(D) exchange rate and interest rate instruments, including 
products such as swaps, forward rate agreements;
(E) transferable securities;
(F) other negotiable instruments and financial assets, including 
bullion.
(xi) Participation in issues of all kinds of securities, including 
underwriting and placement as agent (whether publicly or
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privately) and provision of services related to such issues;
(xii) Money broking;
(xiii) Asset management, such as cash or portfolio management, 
all forms of collective investment management, pension fund 
management, custodial, depository and trust services;
(xiv) Settlement and clearing services for financial assets, 
including securities, derivative products, and other negotiable 
instruments;
(XV) Provision and transfer o f  financial information, and 
financial data processing and related softv^are by suppliers of 
other financial services;
(xvi) Advisory, intermediation and other auxiliary financial 
services on all the activities listed in subparagraphs (v) through 
(XV) ,  including credit reference and analysis, investment and 
portfolio research and advice, advice on acquisitions and on 
corporate restructuring and strategy.
(b) A financial service supplier means any natural or juridical 
person of a Member wishing to supply or supplying financial 
services but the term "financial service supplier" does not 
include a public entity.
(c) "Public entity” means:
(i) a government, a central bank or a monetary authority, of a 
Member, or an entity owned or controlled by a Member, that is 
principally engaged in carrying out governmental functions or 
activities for governmental purposes, not including an entity 
principally engaged in supplying financial services on 
commercial terms; or
(ii) a private entity, performing functions normally performed 
by a central bank or monetary authority, when exercising those 
functions.
Second annex on Financial Services Back to top
1. Notwithstanding Article II of the Agreement and paragraphs 1 
and 2 of the Annex on Article II Exemptions, a Member may, 
during a period of 60 days beginning four months after the date 
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, list in that Annex 
measures relating to financial services which are inconsistent 
with paragraph 1 of Article II of the Agreement.
2. Notwithstanding Article XXI of the Agreement, a Member
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may, during a period of 60 days beginning four months after the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, improve, 
modify or withdraw all or part of the specific commitments on 
financial services inscribed in its Schedule.
3. The Council for Trade in Services shall establish any 
procedures necessary for the application of paragraphs 1 and 2.
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Appendix C
Canadian Schedule o f Commitments Under NAFTA
Sector:
Sub-Sector:
Industrial Classification: 
Type of Reservation:
Description:
Existing M easures:
Aboriginal Affairs
National Treatment (Articles 1102, 1202)
M ost-Favored-Nation Treatment (Articles 1103, 1203)
Local Presence (Article 1205)
Performance Requirements (Article 1106)
Senior Management and Boards o f  Directors (Article 1107)
Cross-Border Services and Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure denying investors o f  
another Party and their investments, or service providers o f  another Party, any 
rights or preferences provided to aboriginal peoples.
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B o f  the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, 
c. 11
Sector: All Sectors
Sub-Sector:
Industrial Classification:
Type of Reservation: National Treatment (Article 1102)
Description: Investment
Existing Measures:
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to residency 
requirements for the ownership by investors o f  another Party, or their 
investments, o f  oceanffont land.
Constitution A ct, 1982, being Schedule B o f  the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, 
c . l l
Sector:
Sub-Sector:
Communications
Telecommunications Transport Networks and Services, Radiocommunications 
and Submarine Cables
Industrial Classification: CPC 752 - Telecommunications Services
CPC 7543 - Connection Services
CPC 7549 - Other Telecom m unications Services Not Elsewhere Classified 
(limited to telecommunications transport networks and services)
Type of Reservation: National Treatment (Article 1102)
M ost-Favored-Nation Treatment (Article 1103)
Senior Management and Boards o f  Directors (Article 1107)
Description: Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to 
investment in telecommunications transport networks and telecommunications 
transport services, radiocommunications and submarine cables, including 
ownership restrictions and measures concerning corporate officers and directors
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Existing M easures:
and place o f  incorporation.
This reservation does not apply to providers o f  enhanced or value-added 
services w hose underlying telecommunications transmission facilities are leased 
from providers o f  public telecommunications transport networks.
B ell Canada A ct, S.C. 1987, c. 19
British Columbia Telephone Com pany Special A ct, S.C. 1916, c. 66 
Teleglobe Canada Reorganization and D ivestiture A ct, S.C. 1987, c. 12 
Telesat Canada Reorganization and D ivestiture A ct, S.C 1991, c. 52 
Radiocom m unication A ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-2 
Telegraphs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-5 
Telecommunications P o licy  Fram ework, 1987
Communications
Telecommunications Transport Networks and Services, Radiocommunications 
and Submarine Cables
Industry Classification: CPC 752 - Telecommunications Services (not including enhanced or value-added
services)
CPC 7543 - Connection Services
CPC 7549 - Other Telecommunications Services N ot Elsewhere Classified  
(limited to telecommunications transport networks and services)
Type of Reservation: National Treatment (Article 1202)
Most-Favored-Nation Treatment (Article 1203)
Local Presence (Article 1205)
Description: Cross-Border Services
Sector:
Sub-Sector:
Existing Measures:
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to 
radiocommunications, submarine cables and the provision o f  telecommunications 
transport networks and telecommunications transport services. These measures 
m ay apply to such matters as market entry, spectrum assignment, tariffs, 
intercarrier agreements, terms and conditions o f  service, interconnection between 
networks and services, and routing requirements that impede the provision on a 
cross-border basis o f  telecommunications transport networks and 
telecommunications transport services, radiocommunications and submarine 
cables.
Telecommunications transport services typically involve the real-time 
transmission o f  customer-supplied information between two or more points 
without any end-to-end change in the form or content o f  the customer's 
information, whether or not such services are offered to the public generally. 
These services include voice and data services by wire, radiocommunications or 
any other electromagnetic means o f  transmission.
This reservation does not apply to measures relating to the cross-border provision 
o f  enhanced or value-added services.
Bell Canada A ct, S.C. 1987, c. 19
British Columbia Telephone Com pany Special Act, S.C. 1916. c. 66Railway Act.
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R.S.C. 1985, c. R-3
Radiocom m unication A ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. K-2Telegraphs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T- 
5
Telecommunications P olicy  Framework, 1987
Telecommunications Decisions, C.R.T.C., including (85-19), (90-3), (91-10), (91- 
21), (92-11) and (92-12)
Sector: Government Finance
Sub-Sector: Securities
Industry Classification: SIC 8152 - Finance and Economic Administration 
Type of Reservation: National Treatment (Article 1102)
Description: Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to the 
acquisition, sale or other disposition by nationals o f  another Party o f  bonds, 
treasury bills or other kinds o f  debt securities issued by the Government o f  
Canada, a province or local government.
Financial Adm inistration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F -1 1Existing Measures:
Sector:
Sub-Sector:
Industrial Classification: 
Type of Reservation:
Description:
Minority Affairs
National Treatment (Articles 1102, 1202)
Local Presence (Article 1205)
Performance Requirements (Article 1106)
Senior Management and Boards o f  Directors (Article 1107)
Cross-Border Services and Investment
Existing Measures:
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure according rights or 
preferences to socially or econom ically disadvantaged minorities.
Sector: Social Services
Sub-Sector;
Industrial Classification:
Type of Reservation: National Treatment (Articles 1102, 1202)
Most-Favored-Nation Treatment (Article 1203)
Local Presence (Article 1205)
Senior Management and Boards o f  Directors (Article 1107)
Description: Cross-Border Services and Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure with respect to the 
provision o f  public law enforcement and correctional services, and the 
following services to the extent that they are social services established or 
maintained for a public purpose: income security or insurance, social security or
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Existing M easures:
insurance, social welfare, public education, public training, health, and child 
care.
Sector:
Sub-Sector:
Industry Classification: 
Type of Reservation:
Description:
Existing M easures:
Transportation 
Air Transportation
SIC 4513 - Non-Scheduled Air Transport, Specialty, Industry
National Treatment (Article 1 102)
Most-Favored-Nation Treatment (Article 1103)
Senior Management and Boards o f  Directors (Article 1107)
Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure that restricts the 
acquisition or establishment o f  an investment in Canada for the provision o f  
specialty air services to a Canadian national or a corporation incorporated and 
having its principal place o f  business in Canada, its ch ief executive officer and 
not fewer than two-thirds o f  its directors as Canadian nationals, and not less than 
75 percent o f  its voting interest owned and controlled by persons otherwise 
m eeting these requirements.
Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2 
A ir Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 2
A ircraft M arking and Registration Regulations, SOR/90-59
Sector: Transportation
Sub-Sector: Water Transportation
Industrial Classification: SIC 4129 - Other Heavy Construction (limited to dredging)
SIC 4541 - Freight and Passenger Water Transport Industry
SIC 4542 - Ferry Industry
SIC 4543 - Marine Towing Industry
SIC 4549 - Other Water Transport Industries
SIC 4552 - Harbour and Port Operation Industries (limited to berthing, 
bunkering and other vessel operations in a port)
SIC 4553 - Marine Salvage Industry
SIC 4554 - Piloting Service, Water Transport Industry
SIC 4559 - Other Service Industries Incidental to Water Transport (not
including landside aspects o f  port activities)
Type of Reservation: National Treatment (Articles 1 102, 1202)
Most-Favored-Nation Treatment (Articles 1103, 1203)
Local Presence (Article 1205)
Performance Requirements (Article 1106)
Senior M anagement and Boards o f  Directors (Article 1107)
Description: Cross-Border Services and Investment
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to 
investment in or provision o f  maritime cabotage services, including;
(a) the transportation o f  goods or passengers by vessel betw'cen points in the 
territory o f  Canada and in its Exclusive Economic Zone;
(b) with respect to waters above the continental shelf, the transportation o f  
goods or passengers in relation to the exploration, exploitation or transportation 
o f  the mineralor non-living namral resources o f  the continental shelf; and
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Existing M easures:
(c) the engaging by vessel in any maritime activity o f  a commercial nature in 
the territory o f  Canada and in its Exclusive Economic Zone and, with respect to 
waters above the continental shelf, in such other maritime activities o f  a 
commercial nature in relation to the exploration, exploitation or transportation 
o f  mineral or non-living natural resources o f  the continental shelf.
This reservation relates to, among other things, local presence requirements for 
service providers entitled to participate in these activities, criteria for the 
issuance o f  a temporary cabotage license to foreign vessels and limits on the 
number o f  cabotage licenses issued to foreign vessels.
C oasting Trade Act, S.C. 1992, c. 31 
Canada Shipping A ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-9 
Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.)
Customs and Excise Offshore A pplication A ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-53
Sector: Transportation
Sub-Sector: Water Transportation
Industry Classification: SIC 4541 - Freight and Passenger Water Transport Industry
SIC 4542 - Ferry Industry
SIC 4543 - Marine Towing Industry
SIC 4549 - Other Water Transport Industries
SIC 4551 - Marine Cargo Handling Industry
SIC 4552 - Harbour and Port Operation Industries
SIC 4553 - Marine Salvage Industry
SIC 4554 - Piloting Service, Water Transport Industry
SIC 4559 - Other Service Industries Incidental to Water Transport
Type of Reservation: National Treatment (Articles 1102, 1202)
M ost-Favored-Nation Treatment (Articles 1103, 1203)
Local Presence (Article 1205)
Performance Requirements (Article 1106)
Senior Management and Boards o f  Directors (Article 1107)
Cross-Border Services and InvestmentDescription:
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure denying service 
providers or investors o f  the United States, or their investments, the benefits 
accorded service providers or investors o f  M exico or any other country, or their 
investments, in sectors or activities equivalent to those subject to Schedule o f  the 
United States, Annex II, page lI-U-9.
Existing Measures:
Sector: Transportation
Sub-Sector: Water Transportation
Industry Classification: SIC 4541 - Freight and Passenger Water Transport Industry
SIC 4542 - Ferry Industry
SIC 4543 - Marine Towing Industry
SIC 4549 - Other Water Transport Industries
SIC 4551 - Marine Cargo Handling Industry
SIC 4552 - Harbour and Port Operation Industries
SIC 4553 - Marine Salvage Industry
SIC 4554 - Piloting Service, Water Transport Industry
SIC 4559 - Other Service Industries Incidental to Water Transport
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Type of Reservation: 
Description:
Existing M easures:
M ost-Favored-Nation Treatment (Article 1203)
Cross-Border Services
Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to the 
implementation o f  agreements, arrangements and other formal or informal 
undertakings with other countries with respect to maritime activities in waters o f  
mutual interest in such areas as pollution control (including double hull 
requirements for oil tankers), safe navigation, barge inspection standards, water 
quality, pilotage, salvage, drug abuse control and maritime communications.
United States Wreckers Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. U-3 
Various agreem ents and arrangements, including:
(a) M emorandum o f  Arrangem ents on G reat Lakes Pilotage;
(b) Canada - United States Joint M arine Pollution Contingency Plan;
(c) Agreem ent with the United States on Loran "C" Service on the East and West 
Coasts; and
(d) Denm ark  - Canada Joint M arine Pollution Circum polar Agreement.
I l l
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Appendix D
Canadian Schedule of Commitments Under the GATS- Financial Services Sector 
WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 
GATS/SC/I 6/Suppi.4/Rev. 1 
6 June 2000 
(00-2236)
Council for Trade in Services 
CANADA
Schedule of Specific Commitments
Supplement 4
Revision
(This is authentic in English and French only)
Revision o f the Canadian Schedule o f Commitments for GATS - Financial Services
Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial 
presence 4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or Sub-sector
Limitations on Market Access
Limitations on National Treatment
Additional Commitments
7. FINANCIAL SERVICES
Measures applicable to all Sectors in Financial Services
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1. Commitments in this Chapter are undertaken in accordance with the Understanding on 
Commitments in Financial Services ("Understanding").
2. For greater certainty, market access commitments with respect to the "cross-border" 
and "consumption abroad" supply o f services (as described in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of 
Article 1 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services) apply only to the transactions 
indicated in paragraphs 3 and 4 o f Market Access of the Understanding. It is understood 
that paragraph 4 of that section of the Understanding does not impose any obligation to 
allow non-resident financial services suppliers to solicit business.
3. The commitments on "commercial presence" are bound according to the 
Understanding.
4. The commitments on "presence of natural persons" are scheduled in accordance with 
the Understanding and bound according to the general limitations applicable to all sectors 
in this schedule (Part I).
5. Otherwise, the commitments in this Chapter are subject to the general conditions or 
limitations applicable to all sectors in this schedule.
(1), (2) None
(1), (2) None, other than:
(i) Certain supplies between members o f a closely-related group of corporations which 
includes a financial institution may be treated as exempt supplies under value-added 
taxes. Imported supplies do not qualify for this treatment.
(ii) Supplies between resident and non-resident branches or representative offices o f a 
financial institution are treated as supplies between separate persons for the purposes of 
value-added taxes.
(3) None, other than:
Federally-regulated financial institutions having capital in excess of $750 million are 
required, within five years o f having reached the threshold, to have 35 per cent of their 
voting shares widely-held and listed and posted for trading on a Canadian Stock 
Exchange.
(3) None, other than:
(i) Certain supplies between members o f a closely-related group of corporations which 
includes a financial institution may be treated as exempt supplies under value-added 
taxes. Imported supplies do not qualify for this treatment.
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Foreign-owned federally regulated institutions (i.e. insurance, banks and trust and loan): 
A controlling number o f shares o f a Canadian subsidiary must be held directly by the 
foreign company incorporated in the jurisdiction where the foreign company, either 
directly or through a subsidiary, principally carries on business.
(ii) Supplies between resident and non-resident branches or representative offices of a 
financial institution are treated as supplies between separate persons for the purposes of 
value-added taxes.
Federally regulated institutions (i.e. insurance, banks and trust and loan): A minimum of 
one half o f directors must be either Canadian citizens ordinarily resident in Canada or 
permanent residents ordinarily resident in Canada.
The Government o f Ontario Management Board Directive and Industrial Development 
Review Process provides for a price preference of up to 10 per cent for Canadian content 
based on value-added in Canada for certain government purchases. The Management 
Board Directive applies on the basis of the nationality of the individual service provider.
(4) See paragraph 4 of headnote on Financial Services.
(4) See paragraph 4 of headnote on Financial Services.
A. Insurance and Insurance-Related Services
(CPC 812*+ 814)
(a) Life, accident and health insurance services (CPC 8121)
(1) None, other than:
Direct insurance (federal): Services must be supplied through a commercial presence 
with the exception of marine insurance.
(1) None
(b) Non-life insurance services (except deposit insurance and similar compensation 
schemes) (CPC 8129)
(All provinces); Services must be supplied through a commercial presence.
(c) Reinsurance and retrocession (CPC 81299*)
Reinsurance and retrocession (federal): Services must be supplied through a commercial 
presence.
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(All provinces, excluding Alberta and New Brunswick): Services must be supplied 
through a commercial presence.
(2) None, other than:
Reinsurance and retrocession (federal, Alberta and Newfoundland): The purchase of 
reinsurance services by a Canadian insurer, other than a life insurer or a reinsurer, from a 
non-resident reinsurer is limited to no more than 25 per cent of the risks undertaken by 
the insurer purchasing the reinsurance.
(2) None, other than:
Direct insurance other than life, personal accident, sickness or marine insurance (federal): 
An excise tax of 10 per cent is applicable on net premiums paid to non-resident insurers 
or exchanges in regard to a contract against a risk ordinarily within Canada, unless such 
insurance is deemed not to be available in Canada.
Direct insurance (Alberta): A fee payable to the province of 50 per cent of the premium 
paid and regulatory notification are required on insurance o f risks in the province by 
unlicensed insurers.
(Saskatchewan): A fee payable to the province of 10 per cent o f the premium is required 
on insurance of risks in the province by unlicensed insurers.
(3) None, other than:
Direct insurance and reinsurance and retrocession (federal): The solicitation of insurance 
services in Canada can only be effected through:
(i) a corporation incorporated under federal or provincial laws;
(ii) a corporation incorporated by or under the laws of another jurisdiction outside 
Canada (i.e., a branch of a foreign corporation);
(iii) an association formed on the plan known as Lloyds; and
(iv) reciprocal insurance exchanges.
(3) None, other than:
Direct insurance and reinsurance and retrocession (Ontario): Capital requirements for 
mutual insurance companies do not apply to certain mutual insurance companies 
incorporated in Ontario.
(Quebec): Three quarters o f directors must be Canadian citizens and a majority must 
reside in Quebec.
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A branch o f a foreign insurance company must be established directly under the foreign 
insurance company incorporated in the jurisdiction where the foreign insurance company, 
either directly or through a subsidiary, principally carries on business.
(All provinces): Insurance activities can only be provided through:
(i) a corporation incorporated under provincial statutes;
(ii) an extra-provincial insurance corporation, i.e., an insurer incorporated by, or under 
the laws of another jurisdiction (including a federally-authorized branch of a foreign 
corporation);
(iii) an association formed on the plan known as Lloyds;
(iv) (excluding Quebec and Prince Edward Island): Reciprocal insurance exchanges.
(Quebec): Every insurer not incorporated under an Act o f Quebec has, in respect of the 
activities it carries on in Quebec, the rights and obligations of an insurance company or 
mutual association incorporated under Acts o f Quebec as the case may be. It can also 
exercise additional activities provided for in the law. However, the activities of such 
corporation will be limited to those allowed under its constituting legislation.
(Alberta and Prince Edward Island): Subsidiaries of foreign insurance corporations must 
be federally authorized.
(Quebec): Non-residents can not acquire, without ministerial approval, either directly or 
indirectly, more than 30 per cent o f the voting rights attached to shares o f a Quebec- 
chartered insurance company or of its controlling entity.
(Quebec): Upon any allotment or transfer o f voting shares of the capital stock insurance 
company "SSQ, Société d'assurance-vie inc" or o f the holding company "Groupe SSQ 
inc", the minister may ask such companies to prove that the shares were offered by 
preference to Quebec residents and subsequently to other Canadian residents, but that no 
offer was made or was acceptable.
(Federal): The purchase of reinsurance services by a Canadian insurer, other than a life 
insurer or reinsurer, from a resident reinsurer is limited to no more than 75 per cent o f the 
risks undertaken by the insurer purchasing the reinsurance.
(British Columbia): Incorporation, share acquisition or application for business 
authorization, where any person controls or will control 10 per cent or more of the votes 
of the company, is subject to ministerial approval.
Motor vehicle insurance (Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia):
Motor vehicle insurance is provided by public monopoly.
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(4) See paragraph 4 of headnote on Financial Services.
(4) See paragraph 4 of headnote on Financial Services.
(d) Services auxiliary to insurance (including broking and agency services) (CPC 8140)
(1) None, other than:
Intermediation of insurance relating to maritime shipping, commercial aviation, space 
launching, freight (including satellites) and goods in international transit (all provinces): 
Services must be supplied through a commercial presence in the province in which the 
service is provided.
(1) None, other than:
(Saskatchewan): Fire or hail insurance contracts have to be signed or countersigned by a 
licensed agent who resides in the province. Where there is disagreement concerning hail 
insurance, such damages are to be estimated by an appraiser who is a taxpayer of the 
province.
(Ontario and Prince Edward Island): Non-resident individual adjusters are prohibited 
from being adjusters in the province.
(Manitoba): Licenses to act as insurance agents and brokers are not issued to non­
residents o f Canada.
(New Brunswick): Licenses shall not be issued to a corporation whose head office is 
outside Canada.
(Alberta and Manitoba): A license to act as a special broker authorized to place insurance 
coverage with unlicensed insurers is restricted to residents o f the province, as the case 
may be.
(British Columbia): Licenses for general insurance shall be issued only to residents of the 
province.
(Prince Edward Island): Licenses to act as insurance agent or adjusters are not issued to 
non-resident o f the province.
(2) None
(2) None, other than:
Intermediation of insurance relating to commercial aviation, space launching, freight 
(including satellites) and goods in international transit (federal): An excise tax of 10 per 
cent is applicable on net premiums paid to non-resident insurers or exchanges in regard to
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a contract against a risk ordinarily within Canada, unless such insurance is deemed not to 
be available in Canada. The excise tax is also applicable on net premiums payable with 
regard to a contract entered into, through a non-resident broker or agent, with any insurer 
authorized under the laws of Canada or o f any province to carry out the business of 
insurance.
(3) None, other than:
(New Brunswick): Licenses shall not be issued to a corporation whose head office is 
outside Canada.
(Ontario and Prince Edward Island): Non-resident individual adjusters are prohibited 
from being adjusters in the province.
(3) None, other than:
(Saskatchewan): Fire or hail insurance contracts have to be signed or countersigned by a 
licensed agent who resides in the province. Where there is disagreement concerning hail 
insurance, such damages are to be estimated by an appraiser who is a taxpayer of the 
province.
(Ontario): No licence is provided to a corporation to act as an insurance broker, agency or 
adjuster if the majority o f the voting rights are in shares owned by non-residents. A 
corporate agency or adjuster or insurance broker which is majority non-resident-owned 
and licensed as a result o f grand-fathering cannot expand through purchase of assets or 
business or merger or amalgamation with any other broker, agent or adjuster. No licence 
is provided to a corporation or partnership which is an insurance agency or adjuster if  the 
head office is outside Canada or if any partner is resident outside Canada.
(Manitoba): Licenses to act as insurance agents and brokers are not issued to non­
residents of Canada.
(Alberta and Manitoba): A license to act as a special broker authorized to place insurance 
coverage with unlicensed insurers is restricted to residents of the province, as the case 
may be.
(British Columbia): Licenses for general insurance shall be issued only to residents o f the 
province.
(Prince Edward Island): Licenses to act as insurance agent or adjusters are not issued to 
non-resident of the province.
(4) See paragraph 4 of headnote on Financial Services.
(4) See paragraph 4 of headnote on Financial Services.
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B. Banking and Other Financial Services 
(excl. insurance)
(1) None
(2) None
(3) None, other than:
(1) None
(2) None
(3) None, other than;
(a) Acceptance o f deposits and other repayable funds from the public (CPC 81115- 
81119)
Banks: To undertake the business of banking in Canada, a foreign bank must:
(i) incorporate a bank subsidiary under the Bank Act; or
(b) Lending of all types, including inter alia, consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring 
and financing of commercial transactions (CPC 8113)
(ii) establish a bank branch under the Bank Act,
In order to establish a bank branch, a foreign bank must be authorised under the Bank Act 
and must be incorporated by or under the laws o f another jurisdiction outside Canada 
(i.e., an authorised foreign bank).
(c) Financial leasing (CPC 8112)
A bank branch must be established directly under the authorised foreign bank 
incorporated in the jurisdiction where the authorised foreign bank principally carries on 
business.
An authorised foreign bank can establish only one of two types of bank branches:
(i) a full service bank branch (i.e., a Schedule III, Part 1, authorised foreign bank); or,
(ii) lending bank branch (i.e., a Schedule III, Part 2, authorised foreign bank).
Full service bank branches and lending bank branches cannot engage in the activities in 
which a specialised financing corporation, as defined in the Bank Act, may engage.
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Full service bank branches and lending bank branches cannot be member institutions of 
the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation.
A full service bank branch can only accept deposits in amounts less than $150,000 and 
payable in Canada if  the sum of all deposits below $150,000 amounts to less than one 
percent o f total deposits payable in Canada.
A lending bank branch can only accept deposits or otherwise borrow money by means of 
financial instruments from, or guarantee any securities or accept any bills of exchanges 
that cannot be subsequently sold to or traded with:
(i) financial institutions, other than a foreign bank; or,
(ii) a foreign bank whose principal activity is the provision of services that would be 
permitted by the Bank Act if  they were provided by a bank in Canada; and, that is 
regulated as a bank in the country under whose laws it was incorporated or in any country 
in which it carries on business.
A lending bank branch cannot be a member o f the Canadian Payments Association.
An authorised foreign bank cannot establish a lending bank branch in conjunction with a 
full service bank branch, a bank subsidiary, a loan company, or a trust company that 
accepts deposits.
No one person (Canadian or foreign) may own more than 10 per cent of any class of 
shares of a Schedule 1 bank
(d) All payment and money transmission services 
(CPC 81339*)
Trust and loan companies (federal
and all provinces, excluding British Colombia): Federal or provincial incorporation is 
required.
Trust and loan companies
(Alberta): At least three quarters o f the directors must be ordinarily resident in Canada.
(e) Guarantees and commitments (CPC 81199*)
(Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba):
The direct or indirect acquisition of Canadian-controlled companies by non-residents is 
restricted to 10 per cent individually and 25 per cent collectively.
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(Saskatchewan): Individual and collective foreign ownership of Canadian-controlled and 
provincially incorporated companies can be no more than 10 per cent o f shares
(British Columbia): Incorporations, share acquisition or application for business 
authorization, where any person controls or will control 10 per cent or more of the votes 
of the company, are subject to ministerial approval.
(New Brunswick): At least two of the directors must be resident in new Brunswick.
(Nova Scotia): A majority o f directors must be resident in Canada and at least two 
resident in Nova Scotia.
(Manitoba and Ontario): Foreign persons may not exercise the voting rights attached to 
shares if they are not registered as shareholders in respect o f the shares.
(Manitoba): Majority of directors must be resident in Canada.
(Quebec): Three quarters o f the directors must be Canadian citizens and a majority must 
reside in Quebec.
(Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia): Incorporation or registration will be refused 
unless authorities are satisfied that there exists a public benefit and advantage for an 
additional corporation.
(Ontario): Consent to change in control or transfers of 10 per cent or more of voting 
shares may be refused if  it would be in the public interest to do so.
Credit unions, caisses populaires and associations or groups thereof (all provinces): Must 
incorporate in the jurisdictions in which they operate.
Credit unions and caisses populaires (Ontario): Directors of credit unions must be 
Canadian citizens or permanent resident.
(British Columbia): Directors and subscribers of credit unions must be residents of the 
province
Mortgage brokers (Ontario); Must incorporate under the laws of Canada, Ontario or of 
another province. Ownership of a corporation by foreign persons must not exceed 10 per 
cent individually and 25 per cent collectively of the total number of equity shares.
(All provinces except British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec): Credit unions and caisses 
populaires are exempt from the corporate capital tax.
(Nova Scotia): Must incorporate under the laws o f Canada or Nova Scotia.
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(Alberta): Directors o f credit unions must be Canadian citizens or permanent residents of 
Canada and three quarters must at all times be ordinarily resident in the province.
(Saskatchewan): Must maintain a business office in the province.
(Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan): Directors o f credit unions must be Canadian 
citizens
(Quebec): Founding members of caisses populaires must have a residence, place of 
business or employment in the territory mentioned in the caisse's statutes.
Community bonds corporations (Manitoba, New Brunswick and Saskatchewan): 
Directors o f Community Bonds corporations must be resident of the province.
Loan and investment companies (Quebec): Federal or provincial incorporation.
Co-operative corporations (Newfoundland and Ontario): Must incorporate under the law 
of the applicable province or under federal law.
Venture capital corporations (federal and all provinces): Measures that result in a 
different tax treatment with respect to an investment in a venture capital corporation as 
prescribed pursuant to the Income Tax Act of Canada and provincial laws.
Lending of all types (Nova Scotia): Must incorporate under the laws of Canada or Nova 
Scotia.
Acceptance o f deposits (Quebec): The acceptance o f deposits o f public and para-public 
institutions is provided by a public monopoly.
(4) See paragraph 4 o f the headnote on Financial Services, and:
Mortgage brokers (Ontario): Must be Canadian citizens or permanent residents of Canada 
and ordinarily resident in Canada.
(Nova Scotia): Must be resident in the province.
(4) See paragraph 4 of the headnote on Financial Services, and:
(f) Trading for own account or for account of customers whether on an exchange, in an 
over-the-counter market or otherwise, the following:
- money market instruments (cheques, bills, certificate of deposits, etc.) (CPC 81339*);
- foreign exchange 
(CPC 81333*);
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(1) None, other than:
Advisory and auxiliary financial services (Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, 
Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan): Services must be supplied through a commercial 
presence in the jurisdiction in which the adviser is providing advice.
Asset management (Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Quebec and 
Saskatchewan): Services must be supplied through a commercial presence in the 
jurisdiction in which the service is provided.
(1) None
- derivative products including but not limited to, futures and options (CPC 8 1339*)
(Quebec): The management of pension funds of public and para-public institutions in 
Quebec is provided by public monopoly.
Custodial services (All provinces): Mutual funds which offer securities in Canada must 
use a resident custodian. A non-resident sub-custodian may be used if  it has shareholders 
equity of at least $100 million.
- exchange rate and interest rate instruments, including products such as swaps, forward 
rate agreements, etc. (CPC 81339*)
(2) None, other than:
Trading in securities and commodity futures - persons (all provinces): There is a 
requirement to register in order to trade through dealers and brokers that are neither 
resident nor registered in the province in which the trade is effected.
(2) None
- transferable securities 
(CPC 81321*)
- other negotiable instruments and financial assets, including bullion 
(CPC 81339*)
(3) None, other than:
Securities dealers and brokers (British Columbia, Ontario, Saskatchewan, Yukon): Must 
be incorporated, formed or continued under federal, provincial or territorial laws
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(Quebec): Only brokerage firms incorporated under federal, provincial or territorial laws 
may be members o f the Montreal Exchange.
(3) None, other than:
Trading in securities and commodity futures and advisory and auxiliary financial services
- dealers, brokers, and advisers: (Alberto, Ontario, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia,
Manitoba and Saskatchewan): A director or officer of an applicant firm must have been a 
resident o f Canada for a period of at least one year prior to the application.
Advisory and auxiliary financial services and Asset Management (Nova Scotia and 
Quebec): The establishment must be managed by a resident of the province.
Custodial services (All provinces): Mutual funds which offer securities in Canada must 
use a resident custodian. A non-resident sub-custodian may be used if it has shareholders 
equity o f at least $100 million
(Quebec): The responsibility for opening up accounts is to be managed by a Quebec 
resident.
(g) Participation in issues o f all kinds of securities, including underwriting and placement 
as agent (whether publicly or privately) and provision of service related to such issues 
(CPC 8132)
Advisory and auxiliary financial services (British Colombia): Must be incorporated, 
formed or continued under federal, provincial or territorial laws.
Asset management (Quebec): The management o f pension funds of public and para- 
public institutions in Quebec is provided by a public monopoly.</PThe file is too large 
for this option. Only the first 30000 characters will be displayed
(h) Money broking (CPC 81339*)
(4) See paragraph 4 of the headnote on Financial services, and
(4) See paragraph 4 of the headnote on Financial services, and:
(i) Asset management, such as cash or portfolio management, all forms of collective 
investment management, custodial, depository and trust services (CPC 8119*, 81323*).
(Quebec): Only Canadian residents may be individual members of the Montreal 
exchange.
Trading in securities and commodity futures and advisory and auxiliary financial services
- dealers, brokers and advisers: (all provinces except British Columbia, New Brunswick 
and Quebec): An individual applicant for registration is required to have been a resident
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of Canada for a period of at least one year prior to the application and a resident of the 
province in which he/she wishes to operate at the date o f application.
(j) Settlement and clearing services for financial assets, inch securities, derivative 
products, and other negotiable instruments (CPC 81339*, 81319)
(Quebec); An individual acting as a representative o f a dealer or adviser, subject to 
certain exemptions, must be a resident o f the province
(k) Advisory, intermediation and other auxiliary financial services on all the activities 
listed in Article 5(a)(v) through (xv) o f the Annex on Financial Services, inch credit 
reference and analysis, investment and portfolio research and advice, advice on 
acquisitions and on corporate restructuring and strategy (CPC 8131*, 8133*)
(1) Provision and transfer o f financial information, and financial data processing and 
related software by providers of other financial services (CPC 8131*, 842*, 843*, 844*)
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Trade in Services 
CANADA
List o f Article II (MFN) Exemptions 
Supplement 2
(This is authentic in English and French only)
This text replaces the Financial Services section contained in pages 2 and 3 of document 
GATS/EL/16.
CANADA - LIST OF ARTICLE II (MFN) EXEMPTIONS
Modes of supply; (1) Cross-border supply (2) Consumption abroad (3) Commercial 
presence (4) Presence of natural persons
Sector or subsector
Description of measure
indicating its inconsistency
with Article II
Countries to which the measure applies 
Intended duration
Conditions creating the need for the exemption
Insurance
Intermediation:
Agency Services
Financial Services, including lending of all types and trading for own account of certain 
securities by loan and investment companies.
Preferential access to the Ontario insurance services market is provided to non-resident 
individual US insurance agents.
126
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Preferential treatment in Quebec for allocation of licences is provided by the Province of 
Quebec to loan and investment companies incorporated under the laws of the Parliament 
o f the United Kingdom and Ireland for purposes o f obtaining a licence to carry on 
business.
All states in the United States
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Republic o f Ireland
Indeterminate
Indeterminate
Reciprocity
Maintenance o f existing historical preference
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